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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CONCEPTUAL FLEXIBILITY: BEHAVIORAL AND NEURAL VARIATIONS IN 
SEMANTIC MEMORY RETRIEVAL 
Nina Shen Hsu 
Sharon L. Thompson-Schill 
Understanding the neural organization of semantic memory – our shared general 
knowledge – has the potential to uncover the neural mechanisms by which we give 
meaning to the endless array of objects that we encounter in the world. One prominent set 
of theories posits a distributed organization of semantic memory – remembering object 
features activates brain regions overlapping with or adjacent to regions involved in 
perceiving and acting on those features (e.g., Allport, 1985). Despite accumulated 
evidence favoring these theories, it is important to understand both the commonalities in 
the mapping between perception and memory, as well as meaningful variability across 
sources such as contexts, people, and use. In three studies, we found evidence that while 
conceptual knowledge is grounded in neural substrates, several factors contribute to 
variations in semantic memory retrieval. In Chapter 2, we used the logic often used in 
neuroimaging studies of semantic memory by demonstrating overlapping chromaticity 
effects (e.g., greater response to colored than grayscale stimuli) in the left lingual gyrus 
for both color perception and color knowledge. Chapter 3 investigated whether the 
mapping between perception and memory varied across contexts and participants. 
Whereas context (here, fidelity of color information as manipulated through task demand) 
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varied the extent to which the left fusiform gyrus was active during a color similarity 
judgment, individual differences in cognitive style predicted activity in the left lingual 
gyrus. We replicated these results in a second experiment that controlled for stimulus 
modality and anticipatory strategies. In Chapter 4, we used a training paradigm to 
investigate the role of feature diagnosticity (i.e., features that best distinguish between 
two otherwise similar categories) in semantic representations. Whereas subjects had 
knowledge of feature importance in novel object categorization, whether they used this 
information affected neural representations. Ventral temporal brain regions were more 
active during a separate retrieval task for subjects who learned and used the diagnostic 
feature for object categorization. Additionally, behavioral ratings of similarity predicted 
multivariate neural similarity. Collectively, this work suggests that semantic 
representations, integral to a memory system often thought of as free of contextual 
constraints, contain meaningful variations across contexts, people, and use. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
 
 
What color are fire engines? What sounds do cows make? These are questions 
that you can easily answer, but can you remember where or when you first acquired this 
information? Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists often refer to semantic memory 
as shared knowledge about the world that gives meaning to objects and concepts. In his 
seminal article, “Episodic and semantic memory,” Endel Tulving borrowed the term 
semantics from linguists in order to describe a memory system for “words and other 
verbal symbols, their meaning and referents, about relations among them, and about 
rules, formulas, and algorithms for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and 
relations” (Tulving, 1972).  
Semantic memory refers to shared general knowledge concerning objects, words, 
facts, and beliefs. Psychologists distinguish it from episodic memory, which is another 
major category of declarative memory, by referring to our ability to retrieve semantic 
information independent of specific experiences. In other words, semantic knowledge can 
be retrieved without reference to the original circumstances under which it was first 
acquired. For example, remembering the color of a fire engine constitutes semantic 
knowledge, whereas remembering where you were when you last heard a fire engine 
would be episodic knowledge. In a taxonomy of long-term memory (e.g., Squire, 1987), 
episodic memory and semantic memory are characterized as being distinct parts of the 
explicit, or declarative, memory system. Under this framework, episodic memory is 
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associated with events, whereas semantic memory is associated with facts. Tulving 
suggests that "the semantic system may be quite independent of the episodic memory" — 
but in order to have semantic knowledge, there must have been some episode where the 
information was learned (i.e., a specific time and place). Cognitive psychologists and 
cognitive neuroscientists have been investigating how we acquire semantic knowledge, 
and what neural mechanisms underlie this acquisition and information storage, so that we 
can make better sense of the endless number of things in the world around us. 
 
A glimpse of semantic memory through neuropsychological studies 
Neuropsychological studies of patients with amnesia due to medial temporal lobe 
atrophy often exhibited impairments in both semantic and episodic memory (Gabrieli, 
Cohen, & Corkin, 1988; Stefanacci, Buffalo, Schmolck, & Squire, 2000), but other 
patient work indicates that impaired episodic memory can be accompanied by relatively 
intact semantic memory (Gabrieli et al., 1988; Gardiner, Brandt, Baddeley, Vargha-
Khadem, & Mishkin, 2008; O’Kane, Kensinger, & Corkin, 2004; Vargha-Khadem et al., 
1997). This work suggests that these two systems are at least partially independent. Other 
studies have demonstrated that in some cases, semantic knowledge can be selectively 
lost. Elizabeth Warrington first noted in 1975 that patients with semantic dementia — a 
temporal variant of frontotemporal dementia — demonstrated a “failure to recognize or 
identify common objects” that could not be accounted for by intellectual impairment, 
sensory or perceptual deficits, or language disorders (Warrington, 1975). Semantic 
dementia is associated with gradual and selective atrophy of the anterior temporal cortex, 
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wherein patients with otherwise intact speech fluency exhibit marked deficits in 
identifying objects, concepts and people (Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1999). 
Importantly, these patients retain episodic knowledge of recent autobiographical events 
(Graham, Lambon, & Hodges, 1997; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1996). 
Some patients exhibit even more selective deficits in semantic knowledge, in 
which specific categories of knowledge are lost. Some patients with category-specific 
deficits had difficulty naming living things (e.g., parrot, snail) but not nonliving things 
(e.g., briefcase, compass), whereas others have presented with the opposite problem 
(Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). In thinking about ways in 
which semantic memory might be organized, one proposal is that semantic knowledge 
divides along categorical, or domain-specific, boundaries (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998). 
On the other hand, early functional neuroimaging studies showed anatomical distinctions 
between objects according to features (sometimes called attributes or properties), even 
within a single category (Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D’Esposito, & Farah, 1999). In one 
early study, Martin and colleagues demonstrated that retrieving color information about 
an object ("yellow" for pencil) activated ventral temporal cortex, whereas retrieving 
motor information about the same object ("write" for pencil) activated middle temporal 
and frontal cortex (Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995). Further, 
distinct but overlapping regions were activated when presenting the objects as words or 
as pictures, suggesting that different stimulus modalities tapped into common neural 
substrates of color or action information. Subsequent work has demonstrated that in line 
with these frameworks, there can be further sub-distinctions, such as grasp and function 
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of use within motor properties (e.g., Boronat et al., 2005), or color, size, and form within 
visual properties (e.g., Thompson-Schill, 2003). 
 
Theories on the organization of semantic memory 
There have been a number of theories developed to explain how our semantic 
knowledge is represented in the brain. Early models assumed an amodal structure to a 
conceptual representation — each concept was represented in a single node that was part 
of a larger, unitary semantic network (Collins & Quillian, 1969), and connections to other 
nodes allowed us to make meaningful associations between concepts. These and other 
models (e.g., Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984) posit an arbitrary relationship between 
perception and knowledge representation — our semantic knowledge is organized 
abstractly and is fundamentally amodal. Though not explicitly addressed, these models 
assumed situational invariance — under all contexts and circumstances, the connections 
between semantic representations (as well as the representations themselves) remained 
stable and fixed. That is, no matter how a particular concept is activated or accessed, that 
evoked concept would always be the same each time. 
A different explanation for the evident neural dissociation of semantic knowledge 
categories is that distinct brain regions may be responsible for different categories of 
knowledge — for example, one region for living things and a different region for non-
living things. In this domain-specific model of semantic memory (see Caramazza & 
Shelton, 1998), distinct brain regions are innately tuned to represent those categories 
necessary for survival (e.g., animals, fruits, vegetables, tools). On this account, distinct 
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and non-overlapping representations of these categories would be stored in corresponding 
non-overlapping brain regions that have adapted to specialization for these categories. 
Elaborations of this model (Mahon & Caramazza, 2003, 2011) posit that these 
representations may be organized by property (i.e., sensorimotor-based), but that within 
each modality, the specific categories remain distinct, perhaps constrained by anatomical 
or functional connectivity. Domain-specific theories depart from the notion of a unitary 
semantic network, but nevertheless maintain that conceptual representations — while 
organized by domain or category — remain situationally invariant and fixed. 
An alternative to domain-specific theories is sensory-functional theory, which 
assumes that semantic memory is organized according to the sensory and functional 
properties of objects. Different representations might rely on sensory and functional 
information to varying extents (e.g., Farah & McClelland, 1991; Warrington & 
McCarthy, 1987), and category-specific deficits could arise from an organization of 
semantic knowledge that would not necessarily require explicit categorical boundaries. 
Noting that this binary sensory-functional divide might be overly simplistic, Allport 
(1985) proposed that sensory information could be further subdivided into multiple 
attributes (e.g., color, form, sound), so that "the same neural elements that are involved in 
coding the sensory attributes of a (possibly unknown) object presented to eye or hand or 
ear also make up the elements of the auto-associated activity-patterns that represent 
familiar object-concepts in ‘semantic memory.'" Thus, in sensorimotor- or property-based 
theories of semantic memory (Allport, 1985; Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; 
Alex Martin, 2007; Thompson-Schill, 2003), object knowledge is organized in a 
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distributed, modality-specific fashion, and is stored in overlapping or adjacent brain 
regions that are involved in perceiving and acting on those objects. Importantly, these 
theories permit the notion of conceptual flexibility: features can be dynamically recruited 
depending on the circumstances. That is, the degree to which a feature contributes to the 
concept can vary, depending on both the importance of the feature (relative to other 
features) and the context under which the concept is evoked.  
A third set of theories considers the correlation of certain features that tend to 
occur for the majority of members within a category (Devlin, Gonnerman, Andersen, & 
Seidenberg, 1998; Gonnerman, Andersen, Devlin, Kempler, & Seidenberg, 1997; Tyler 
& Moss, 2001). Here, features can consist not only of sensory information about an 
object, but also of experience-based or encyclopedic knowledge concerning features of 
the object. Classes of objects are determined by the differential extent to which particular 
features co-occur with other members of the category (e.g., the general category of 
“living things” might be predominantly composed of members that "have four legs" and 
"have fur"). Importantly, because members within a category can share a large number of 
features, these models propose that distinctive or diagnostic features are necessary in 
order to identify individual members of the set. In addition to considering the differential 
importance of features for a concept, these theories also posit experience-dependence. 
Over the long term, contextual constraints that are relevant during learning contribute to 
the overall concept. 
In sum, these theories generally assume that distinct neural regions are 
responsible for distributed semantic representations. But what neural substrates underlie 
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our ability to perform higher-level abstraction, convergence, and manipulation of this 
information? Semantic memory models that incorporate "convergence zones" (Damasio, 
1989) posit that distinct brain regions are involved in integrating and processing general 
semantic information, as opposed to modality-specific semantic information, while 
maintaining category-like topography (Simmons & Barsalou, 2003). There is no general 
consensus on the specific regions that are responsible for this higher-level convergence. 
Some researchers have suggested that the anterior temporal poles serve a critical role in 
semantic integration (Lambon Ralph, Lowe, & Rogers, 2007; Patterson, Nestor, & 
Rogers, 2007; Rogers et al., 2004), whereas others posit that integration occurs in an 
interactive hierarchy throughout much of the ventral temporal cortex and in the inferior 
parietal lobe (Binder & Desai, 2011). 
 
Functional neuroimaging studies of semantic memory 
As described above, much research on semantic memory has relied on studies of 
patients with different types of problems in semantic knowledge. More recently, the 
development of functional neuroimaging techniques, such as positron emission 
technology (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), has allowed 
cognitive neuroscientists to explore various hypotheses regarding the neurobiology of 
semantic memory in healthy individuals.  
Some early neuroimaging studies sought to examine whether semantic knowledge 
could be organized along categorical boundaries, with distinct neural substrates for 
different object categories. Most of these studies examined differences between living 
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and nonliving things, or between animals and tools. When naming living things, subjects 
tended to activate medial temporal cortex, whereas naming nonliving things activated the 
left medial occipital cortex (Mummery, Patterson, Hodges, & Wise, 1996). Spitzer and 
colleagues (Spitzer et al., 1998; Spitzer, Kwong, Kennedy, Rosen, & Belliveau, 1995) 
also found category-specific activation on frontal and temporo-parietal regions. Naming 
of animals resulted in activation in the medial temporo-occipital cortex, including 
fusiform gyrus (Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Hichwa, & Damasio, 1996; Grabowski, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1998; Grossman et al., 2002; Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & 
Haxby, 1996; Okada et al., 2000; Perani et al., 1995), whereas naming of tools activated 
the posterior temporal cortex (Damasio et al., 1996; Grabowski et al., 1998; Grossman et 
al., 2002; Martin et al., 1996; Okada et al., 2000; Perani et al., 1995), inferior parietal 
regions (Okada et al., 2000), and premotor cortex (Damasio et al., 1996; Grabowski et al., 
1998). One study also found that lateral fusiform activity was specific to animal naming, 
whereas medial fusiform activity was specific to tool naming (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 
1999), though a subsequent study did not find category-specific activation in the fusiform 
gyrus (Tyler et al., 2003). 
Taken together, these results would suggest that semantic memory is organized 
categorically, in that distinct anatomical regions are differentially activated when 
retrieving information about different object categories. However, as briefly outlined 
earlier, sensory-functional and sensorimotor theories can also account for putatively 
category-specific activation. These theories posit differential weighting of attributes (e.g., 
visual or functional) that might vary by category, giving rise to semantic structure that is 
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not explicitly organized by category. Neuroimaging studies also provide corroboration 
for such theories — in an early example, naming of both animals and tools activated the 
ventral temporal cortex. Importantly, naming animals selectively activated left medial 
occipital areas, whereas naming tools selectively activated left premotor areas (Martin et 
al., 1996).  
The idea that different features carry differing amounts of importance for a given 
object raises several additional areas for study, both on the contextual issues surrounding 
the representations, and more generally on how object representations allow us to make 
sense of constant variation in the world. Context (i.e., a source of variation) can be 
important at different timescales in semantic memory. It may play an important role 
initially, in that when we acquire features about an object, contextual variation may 
interact with construction of the semantic representation as a whole, over the long term. 
Context may also be relevant for short-term demands, in the sense that circumstances 
such as the immediate task or the specific type of stimulus might influence differential 
access to the semantic representation. As one example, Martin and colleagues (1995) 
found that distinct neural regions were involved in remembering color or action 
information about objects. They found overlapping but distinct regions when presenting 
the objects as words or pictures. The overlap was interpreted as consistency across 
stimulus modality, but what about the areas activated for words but not pictures (and vice 
versa)? How might contextual factors such as stimulus modality tap into conceptual 
representations? 
The influence of context through an interaction of task and category has been 
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illustrated in at least one neuroimaging study (Thompson-Schill et al., 1999). For 
category, if semantic knowledge is distributed by feature, then retrieving different object 
features (e.g., visual or functional) about different object categories (e.g., living or non-
living things) should activate distinct brain regions. For task, specifically, retrieving non-
visual information about living things (e.g., whether zebras live in Africa) would activate 
regions involved in visual knowledge, because visual information is strongly tied to the 
object representation. Accessing a weaker part of the object representation (i.e., non-
visual knowledge) would nevertheless be sufficient to activate the stronger part of the 
representation (here, visual knowledge). Furthermore, retrieving semantic knowledge 
about the visual features of non-living things should activate regions involved in visual 
knowledge, even if functional information may be more important overall.  
Thompson-Schill and colleagues (1999) found evidence for exactly this type of 
dissociation. They observed activity in the left fusiform gyrus, a region associated with 
visual knowledge, during retrieval of both visual and non-visual information about living 
things. They also observed activity in this same region during retrieval of non-living 
things, but only when asking about visual features of such objects. Phillips and colleagues 
had complementary findings, in which action and non-action tasks activated the left 
middle temporal cortex for tools, whereas only action tasks activated the same region for 
fruits (Phillips, Humphreys, Noppeney, & Price, 2002). Together, these findings (and 
others) suggest that putatively category-specific activations may instead reflect the 
different levels of importance associated with features in different object categories. They 
also suggest that short-term contextual factors such as task demand can affect semantic 
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memory retrieval. 
The evidence thus far suggests that neuroimaging studies tend to support feature-
based theories of semantic memory. These theories make an additional prediction: the 
same neural regions involved in perceiving and acting on objects should also be activated 
when retrieving knowledge about those objects. Neuroimaging studies have also provided 
some evidence in support of this prediction, by demonstrating overlapping or adjacent 
neural substrates for visual knowledge (Chao & Martin, 1999; Kosslyn, Thompson, Kim, 
& Alpert, 1995; Martin et al., 1995; Simmons et al., 2007), hearing (Hughes et al., 2001; 
Kraemer, Macrae, Green, & Kelley, 2005; Wheeler, Petersen, & Buckner, 2000; Yoo, 
Lee, & Choi, 2001), and action (Chao & Martin, 2000; Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller, 
2004; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003; Oliver, Geiger, Lewandowski, & Thompson-
Schill, 2009; Yee, Drucker, & Thompson-Schill, 2010). 
Feature-based models predict that there may be considerable overlap of brain 
regions involved in both perception and memory of object features. Consequently, we can 
propose adding another theoretical principle of information processing. Functional and 
anatomical dissection of the brain into multiple visual areas (e.g., V1, V2, etc.), based on 
the observation that visual areas respond preferentially to different types of stimuli, has 
primarily been associated with explanatory theories focusing on hierarchy and parallel 
processing (see Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004 for review). Hierarchical visual processing 
suggests that we first locally process visual information in high resolution, with a high 
degree of similarity to how that information was initially perceived. After this initial local 
processing, the visual information is then abstracted and processed more holistically as it 
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moves through visual processing streams. Further, we can conceptually divide this visual 
information into two main components: a ventral “what” stream important for object 
recognition and form, and a dorsal “where” stream responsible for processing spatial and 
motor information about the stimulus. We can consider these distinctions to be roughly 
analogous to the divisions described in sensorimotor models of semantic memory. 
Moreover, we can consider these “streams” to be pathways along which neural 
representations might vary along multiple dimensions, wherein multiple visual areas 
underlie multiple semantic representations.  
 
Motivation for the current studies 
 For the experiments described in Chapters 2-4, we investigated semantic memory 
through the domain of object color. Research focusing on object color is convenient for 
several reasons. First, as a feature that is often critical for object identification, color 
allows research into behavioral and neural measures of semantic memory retrieval, as 
well as possible correlations between these attributes. Second, color is a feature that is 
solely experienced through the visual modality, unlike features such as shape or size. 
Third, several previous studies in neuroimaging have already examined color perception 
in the context of semantic memory, which helps to provide a foundation of prior research 
for the current set of studies, as well as some a priori predictions which can be tested. 
 The existing literature on semantic memory (both psychological and neural) has 
generally sought to investigate semantic representations that are, as Allport wrote, 
“patterns of events that are already familiar (i.e. that stably recur)” (1985). In other 
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words, semantic memory has often been treated as if it were essentially void of context. 
Episodic memory carries an autobiographical tag — contextual information comprised of 
some degree of spatial and/or temporal association. But, even though semantic memory 
may be defined as having some detachment from autobiographical content, there are 
reported variabilities, despite the “general” consensus shown by neuroimaging. As one 
example, color studies in semantic memory often cite ventral temporal regions as being 
involved in both color perception and memory retrieval. Chao & Martin (1999) failed to 
find overlap in brain regions involved in both processes, but Simmons and colleagues 
(2007) did find overlap in the left fusiform gyrus. Our understanding of the neurobiology 
of semantic memory would be enhanced if we can better understand this variability, as it 
would help to clarify the extent to which semantic memory may be less stable and fixed 
than was previously believed. That is, given this observed variability, are neural 
representations stable and fixed, or are they linked to contextual constraints that may 
occur at differing timescales? 
The goal of this dissertation was to examine contextual factors that contribute to 
variability in semantic memory retrieval. The research has two main goals: first, to 
investigate systematic factors in memory retrieval; and second, to provide a framework 
which would incorporate the varying results which have emerged from prior research. 
We begin, in Chapter 2, by first using the logic behind most neuroimaging studies of 
semantic memory. Through chromaticity (i.e., a greater response to colored than to 
grayscale stimuli), we investigated whether overlapping brain regions are involved in 
perception and memory. This chromaticity effect has often been used in color perception 
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and psychophysics experiments (Beauchamp, Haxby, Jennings, & DeYoe, 1999; 
Simmons et al., 2007). Here, in accordance with sensorimotor theory, we sought to 
examine whether memory retrieval would parallel the chromaticity effect in color 
perception. If we could demonstrate activation in a given brain region during both color 
perception and knowledge retrieval, then this would provide evidence that similar neural 
substrates are involved in both processes. 
 Having established the theoretical paradigm in Chapter 2, we turn to factors that 
contribute to variability in semantic memory under a number of different circumstances. 
First, in Chapter 3, we examine context and cognitive style, these being two factors that 
can modulate differences in brain activity observed during color knowledge retrieval. In 
order to examine the role of context, which is a task factor, we manipulated the level of 
detail that subjects retrieved about object color. In order to examine the role of cognitive 
style, which is a subject factor, we asked subjects to self-report their preference for words 
or pictures. By using this approach, we can investigate whether semantic memory — as 
expressed in terms of knowledge of object color — would likely be the same under all 
conditions (i.e., short-term context within the demands of the current trial), and for all 
people (i.e, generalizing to the population as a whole). 
 In Chapter 4, we consider the notion of how different features might take on 
varying levels of importance in a given object representation, and apply this concept to a 
novel object training paradigm. More specifically, Chapter 4 uses this training paradigm 
to examine the role of feature diagnosticity — those features that permit distinctions 
between otherwise similar items. This methodology allows us to systematically 
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manipulate object stimulus properties, tasks, and object environments. As noted 
previously, in Chapter 3 we treated context as a short-term task factor. By contrast, in 
Chapter 4 we vary context as a long-term, learned factor, and consequently are able to 
test whether semantic memory retrieval will be the same under all conditions (i.e., long-
term context). The training paradigm laid out in Chapter 4 allows us to explicitly 
manipulate long-term context in terms of visual experience and semantic memory, and 
thus to study subsequent psychological and neural measures of feature diagnosticity in 
newly learned object representations. 
 Semantic memory allows us to give meaning to, and make sense of, the constant 
variation that we experience in the world on a daily basis. In order to better understand 
semantic memory, we must investigate sources of these semantic memory variations — 
in different contexts, for different people, and in different utilities. Taken together, the 
work presented in Chapters 2-4 helps to shed light on some of the sources of variability in 
semantic memory retrieval for both common and novel objects. 
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CHAPTER 2: Chromaticity of color perception and object color knowledge 
 
Hsu, N.S., Frankland, S.M., & Thompson-Schill, S.L. (2012). Chromaticity of color 
perception and object color knowledge. Neuropsychologia, 50(2), 327-333. 
  
Abstract 
Sensorimotor theories of semantic memory require overlap between conceptual and 
perceptual representations. One source of evidence for such overlap comes from 
neuroimaging reports of co-activation during memory retrieval and perception. For 
example, regions involved in color perception (i.e., regions that respond more to colored 
than grayscale stimuli) are activated by retrieval of object color. One unanswered 
question from these studies is whether the distinctions that are observed during 
perception are also observed during memory retrieval. That is, are regions defined by a 
chromaticity effect in perception similarly modulated by the chromaticity of remembered 
objects (e.g., lemons more than coal)? Subjects performed color perception and color 
retrieval tasks while undergoing fMRI. We observed increased activation during both 
perception and memory retrieval of chromatic compared to achromatic stimuli in 
overlapping areas of the left lingual gyrus, but not in dorsal or anterior regions activated 
during color perception. These results provide evidence in support of sensorimotor 
theories, but suggest important distinctions within the conceptual system. 
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Introduction 
According to sensorimotor theories of semantic memory, object knowledge is 
organized in a modality-specific fashion, and distributed in or near the brain regions 
responsible for perceiving and acting on objects (Allport, 1985; Barsalou, 1999; 
Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). Numerous behavioral, neuroimaging, and 
neuropsychological studies have provided evidence supporting these theories, and 
neuroimaging studies in particular have demonstrated that retrieval of knowledge about 
object features will recruit the brain regions which would be involved in perceiving those 
features (Martin, 2007; Thompson-Schill, 2003). For this study, we investigated color in 
the visual modality. Color has several features, which are useful for our purposes. It is 
especially important for object recognition, and also is perceived solely through the 
visual modality, unlike other features of object appearance such as shape or size. 
Consequently, sensorimotor theories offer clear predictions about how color information 
is represented in semantic memory. 
Cortical regions involved in color perception are typically defined as those 
responding more to viewing of colored stimuli than grayscale stimuli. Previously, 
subjects have passively viewed colored and grayscale Mondrians (Chao & Martin, 1999; 
Howard et al., 1998), actively viewed these stimuli by detecting characters in the displays 
(Beauchamp et al., 1999), or actively made luminance judgments on the Farnsworth-
Munsell 100 Hue stimuli (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Simmons et al., 2007). There is some 
variability with respect to the brain regions activated during these tasks, but they all tend 
to include lateralized or bilateral fusiform and lingual gyri. Some studies have also 
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investigated brain regions involved in color knowledge retrieval, using different tasks 
including judgments of color similarity (Howard et al., 1998), object color naming (Chao 
& Martin, 1999; Martin et al., 1995), as well as property verification (Simmons et al., 
2007). In particular, two studies found activation of the left fusiform gyrus during both a 
color perception task and color knowledge retrieval task, suggesting that areas involved 
in perceiving color are also involved when retrieving object color (Hsu, Kraemer, Oliver, 
Schlichting, & Thompson-Schill, 2011; Simmons et al., 2007). 
This prior research has not resolved two interesting questions. First, tasks 
involving color perception tend to result in activation of several brain areas, but 
neuroimaging studies found overlap only in one anterior region. Why were posterior 
regions not activated during color knowledge retrieval? Second, previous studies did not 
use a color knowledge retrieval task that is directly analogous to the color perception 
tasks. That is, if brain regions involved in color perception are identified as those 
responding more to colored than grayscale stimuli, then we would expect a similar 
chromaticity effect in color knowledge (i.e., thinking about the colors of lemons versus 
coal). Specifically, we would expect differential recruitment of color perception regions, 
when retrieving knowledge about chromatic versus achromatic object colors.  
To address these issues, we conducted the current investigation, in which subjects 
retrieved color knowledge by comparing luminance of named object pairs while 
undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). For the conditions of interest, 
these object pairs were of two chromatic objects, or two achromatic objects. Subjects also 
performed a color perception task, in which they judged the luminance of colored or 
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grayscale visual displays. We found overlapping brain regions involved in both 
perception and knowledge retrieval in a posterior region, this being the left lingual gyrus. 
Further, we found that in ventral but not dorsal regions involved in the color perception 
task, there was more activity when retrieving chromatic versus achromatic color 
knowledge. Our findings are the first to demonstrate that chromaticity distinctions in 
color perception extend to color knowledge, and thus provide further support to 
sensorimotor theories of semantic memory. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 Eighteen right-handed, native English speakers with no history of neurological 
disorders participated in this study (8 males; average age: 23.3). All subjects provided 
informed consent and practiced both tasks prior to scanning. The University of 
Pennsylvania IRB approved all experimental procedures. Participants received monetary 
compensation for their participation. 
 
Task — color knowledge retrieval 
 Subjects made a luminance judgment on a named pair of objects, indicating which 
object was lighter or darker. The conditions of interest named chromatic (e.g., LEMON 
and BASKETBALL) or achromatic (e.g. COAL and SNOW) objects. The 206 objects 
(102 achromatic, 104 chromatic) used in the experiment were rated for color agreement 
(> 66%) by an independent group of 24 subjects, drawn from the same population as the 
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study sample. The conditions did not differ from one another in terms of frequency, word 
length, concreteness, familiarity, imageability, or percent color/chromatic agreement (see 
Table 2.1 for characteristics of word stimuli). There were 98 trials for each condition. As 
a baseline task, subjects judged which of a pair of abstract (e.g., GREED and DELIGHT) 
concepts was better or worse. For a list of stimuli used in the color knowledge task, see 
Table 2.2. 
 At the beginning of each trial, a pair of words and a prompt, randomly assigned to 
display “lighter?” or “darker?” (“better?” or “worse?” for the abstract condition) 
simultaneously appeared on the screen for 2700 msec (see Figure 2.1). During this time 
window, the subjects’ task was to decide which named object was lighter or darker, 
indicating their response via button press. At the end of the trial, a central fixation cross 
appeared for 300 msec, for a total trial duration of 3000 msec. 
We blocked conditions as follows: 7 trials of one condition (21 seconds) followed 
by 12 seconds of passive fixation, 7 trials of the second condition followed by 12 seconds 
of passive fixation, then 7 trials of the third condition, and so on. We permuted condition 
order across subjects, but there was always a fixed stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) for 
the 7 trials in each 21 second block. We used E-Prime software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc.) to present stimuli and to collect response data. 
 
Task — color perception 
After subjects completed the color retrieval task, we administered a functional 
localizer to identify brain regions involved in color perception. Participants saw blocks of 
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the Farnsworth-Munsell 100 hue stimuli, in which they judged whether the wedges 
making up colored or grayscale wheels were sequentially ordered from lightest to 
darkest. The methods and stimuli for this task have been used previously to identify brain 
regions involved in color perception (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Hsu et al., 2011; W. 
Simmons et al., 2007).  
 
Scanning Procedure  
 We acquired imaging data using a 3T Siemens Trio system with a standard 8-
channel head coil and foam padding to secure the head position. After we acquired T1-
weighted anatomical images (TR = 1620 msec, TE = 3 msec, TI = 950 msec, voxel size = 
0.9766 mm x 0.9766 mm x 1.0 mm), each subject performed four runs of the color 
knowledge retrieval task, followed by two runs of the color perception task, while 
undergoing blood oxygen dependent (BOLD) imaging (Ogawa et al., 1993). We collected 
774 sets of 42 slices using interleaved, gradient echo, echoplanar imaging (TR = 3000 
msec, TE = 30 msec, FOV = 19.2 cm x 19.2 cm, voxel size = 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm x 3.0 
mm). Nine seconds of “dummy” gradient and radio frequency pulses preceded each 
functional scan to allow for steady-state magnetization; during this initial time period, we 
did not present stimuli or collect fMRI data.  
 
Image Processing 
 We analyzed the data using VoxBo (www.voxbo.org) and SPM2 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Anatomical data for each subject was processed using the 
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FMRIB Software Library (FSL) toolkit (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) to correct for 
spatial inhomogeneities and to perform non-linear noise reduction. Functional data were 
sinc interpolated in time to correct for the slice acquisition sequence; motion corrected 
with a six-parameter, least squares, rigid body realignment routine using the first 
functional image as a reference; and normalized in SPM2 to a standard template in 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. Data were smoothed using a 9mm full-
width half-max Gaussian smoothing kernel. Following preprocessing for each subject, a 
power spectrum for one functional run was fit with a 1/frequency function, and this 
model was used to estimate the intrinsic temporal autocorrelation of the functional data 
(Zarahn, Aguirre, & D’Esposito, 1997).  
 We fit a modified general linear model (Worsley & Friston, 1995) to each 
subject’s data to the four runs of the color retrieval task, in which the conditions of 
interest (chromatic, achromatic, abstract) were each modeled as a 21-second block and 
convolved with a standard hemodynamic response function. Several covariates of no 
interest (global signal, scan effects, movement, spikes) were also included in the model. 
An adjusted response latency for each trial for all conditions (i.e., a mean centered log 
transformation of each subject’s RT) was also entered as a continuous covariate of no 
interest, to address any difficulty or “time on task” confounds. From this model, we 
computed parameter estimates for each condition (compared to fixation baseline) at each 
voxel, and these estimates were included in the group-level random effects analyses 
described below. Independently, we fit a second modified GLM to each subject’s data 
from the two runs of the color perception task, in which the conditions of interest 
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(colored versus grayscale stimuli) were modeled as blocks in the same manner as 
described above. Aside from this difference in the conditions of interest, the two models 
were constructed identically. 
 
Results 
Behavioral Results 
Color knowledge retrieval task: There was a significant RT difference across 
conditions, F(2, 51) = 5.78, p = 0.005 (chromatic: M = 1873 ms, SD = 173 ms; 
achromatic: M = 1782 ms, SD = 145 ms; abstract: M = 1694 ms, SD = 155 ms). We found 
this RT difference substantial enough to warrant entering the RT for each trial as a 
continuous covariate of no interest in the GLM, such that any differences reported below 
describe condition differences, rather than RT differences. Note that the inclusion of this 
covariate has the effect of underestimating the chromaticity effect on the BOLD 
response. 
 Color perception task: There were no RT differences between chromatic and 
achromatic perceptual judgments [(chromatic: M = 1473 ms, SD = 204 ms; achromatic: 
M = 1439 ms, SD = 230 ms), t(17) = 1.43, p = 0.17)], though participants were 
significantly worse at chromatic judgments [(chromatic: M = 73%, SD = 5.6%; 
achromatic: M = 79%, SD = 5.9%), t(17) = 3.00, p = 0.008].  
 
Functional Region of Interest Analyses: Left Lingual Gyrus 
To establish functionally defined regions of interest (fROIs) in which to assess the 
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effects of chromaticity on color knowledge retrieval, we first performed a group-level 
random effects analysis on the color perception data, comparing brain activity of colored 
stimuli to that of grayscale stimuli as in prior studies. No regions responded more to 
grayscale than colored stimuli. We corrected for multiple comparisons (at α = 0.05) by 
performing 1000 Monte Carlo permutations of the data, deriving a critical threshold of t = 
6.16 (Nichols & Holmes, 2002). When examining those regions that responded more to 
colored than grayscale stimuli, only one fROI (17 voxels) in the left lingual gyrus 
(Talairach coordinates: -9, -87, 4) surpassed the corrected threshold. Within this region, 
we calculated parameter estimates for each subject, for each condition of the color 
retrieval task, on the spatially-averaged time series. We assessed an effect of concrete 
versus abstract concepts by testing a comparison of both types of conceptual knowledge 
to abstract knowledge. The chromaticity effect was assessed by using a paired t-test of 
the difference between the chromatic and achromatic parameters. In the left lingual gyrus, 
there was significantly greater activity when retrieving concrete versus abstract 
knowledge ([Chromatic + Achromatic] — Abstract; t(17) = 2.85, p = 0.01). Critically, 
there was significantly greater activity when retrieving chromatic versus achromatic 
knowledge ([Chromatic – Achromatic]; t(17) = 2.29, p = 0.04]). 
The preceding analyses establish that a chromaticity effect during color retrieval 
is observed in a region that exhibits a chromaticity effect during color perception. This 
effect, while a direct test of the hypothesis of interest, is a narrow way to address the 
extent and location of overlap during perception and memory processing. Towards this 
end, we visually assessed co-localization of regions involved in both tasks. In a manner 
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similar to the group-level random effects analysis performed on the color perception data, 
we performed a similar analysis on the color knowledge retrieval data, again from all 18 
subjects. For this dataset, we compared brain activity in the chromatic condition to that in 
the achromatic condition. Next, within occipital brain regions, we identified the top 50 
voxels that were most active during each task, irrespective of threshold. For the color 
perception task, Talairach coordinates for the peak voxel were -9, -87, 4. For the color 
knowledge task, Talairach coordinates for the peak voxel were -9, -93, 2. As seen in 
Figure 2.2, we found co-localization of seven voxels in the left lingual gyrus. This result 
suggests not only that the lingual gyrus is involved in both color perception and 
knowledge retrieval, but that it is recruited more for the chromatic condition in both 
processes (more so than the achromatic condition of both processes).  
 
Exploratory Whole Brain Analyses: Ventral and Dorsal Distinctions 
In order to ascertain the specificity of this effect, we examined brain activity at a 
less stringent threshold to determine whether other brain regions were active for either 
task. For this exploratory analysis, we examined the group color perception data at an 
uncorrected threshold of p < 0.001(t = 3.97), which yielded 27 distinct clusters, as shown 
in Figure 2.3. We then created 27 fROIs of comparable size by identifying each 
individual local maximum and any of the 26 surrounding voxels that also surpassed the 
uncorrected threshold (see Table 2.3 for the coordinates of these local maxima). In order 
to assess the chromaticity effect during memory retrieval within these regions, we 
calculated parameter estimates for each subject for each condition (compared to baseline) 
	  
	  
26 
on the spatially-averaged time series across voxels within each fROI.  
Upon doing this, we observed an unanticipated pattern, which is evident in the 
order we have arranged the clusters in Figure 2.4: The difference in response to 
chromatic versus achromatic memory retrieval was larger and more consistent in the 
ventral fROIs than in the dorsal fROIs. Although the chromaticity effects did not reach 
significance in individual fROIs, the reliability of the pattern can be established with a 
post-hoc binomial test. In the nine most ventral fROIs (z < 5), all nine of the fROIs 
showed numerically greater activation for chromatic compared to achromatic stimuli (p = 
0.004). In contrast, the pattern was not consistent across the 18 dorsal fROIs (p = 0.48). 
Although these results should be interpreted with caution, they suggest that the effect 
reported above in the left lingual gyrus may be a more widespread pattern in ventral but 
not dorsal regions of the visual system. In the following section, motivated by previous 
work, we take a closer look at one such region, the left fusiform gyrus.  
 
Secondary Region of Interest Analyses: Fusiform Gyrus 
 Previous research has shown that the fusiform gyrus is involved in both color 
knowledge retrieval and color imagery and perception (Howard et al., 1998; Simmons et 
al., 2007). In all analyses thus far, ROIs were functionally defined, and the fusiform 
gyrus did not emerge as an active region when contrasting the chromatic to achromatic 
conditions in either task (i.e., activity did not surpass either the uncorrected or permuted 
threshold). However, for our color knowledge task, the left fusiform gyrus was robustly 
active when comparing both chromatic and achromatic pairs (combined) to the abstract 
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pairs (t[17] = 4.63, p < .001). The Talairach coordinates for the peak active voxel for this 
contrast were -33, -36, -13 ; this is almost identical to the peak voxel in left fusiform 
gyrus as reported by Simmons and colleagues for their color knowledge task ( -33, -36, -
16). The proximity of these peak voxel coordinates across studies suggests that our 
memory task, and other tasks which have been used in prior research, are both tapping 
into color knowledge retrieval processes, though again, there was no main effect of 
chromaticity (t[17] = 0.38, p = 0.71).  
 Several prior studies have reported that this region of the fusiform gyrus is active 
during color perception (that is, more active during perception of chromatic compared to 
achromatic stimuli) in addition to during retrieval of color (Simmons et al., 2007). We 
did not observe this effect in the analyses we reported above; although we used their 
same procedure and stimuli to manipulate color perception, there were some differences 
in our analyses. Subsequently, we repeated the analysis of the perception data without 
including global signal as a covariate in the model (following from Simmons et al., 
2007), and this new analysis does show a chromaticity effect in color perception in the 
fusiform gyrus. In this functionally-defined fusiform region, there was a trend towards a 
chromaticity effect on the knowledge retrieval task, though it did not reach statistical 
significance (t(17) = 1.82, p = 0.09). Finally, in applying a similar approach as described 
earlier — in which we identified the top voxels in ventral temporal regions that were 
involved in both tasks, irrespective of threshold — in analyses without global signal in 
the models, we observed near (but not direct) voxel overlap between task activation (in 
memory) and chromaticity (in perception).  
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 In sum, these additional analyses suggest a role for the left fusiform gyrus in color 
perception and memory. However, they also show that the pattern of activation in this 
region is different in a number of ways from that observed in the left lingual region, 
being more correlated with global signal, and less sensitive to chromaticity in memory. 
We will return to these differences and their possible implications below. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of this study demonstrate that a chromaticity effect (namely, greater 
activation to colored than grayscale stimuli), which has already been documented in color 
perception, is paralleled in memory retrieval. This tests an important prediction of 
sensorimotor models of memory, which propose that the same processes invoked during 
perception of a sensory property will also contribute to memory of that property. 
Therefore, under these models, if there are different neural patterns associated with the 
perception of chromatic versus achromatic stimuli, this difference should emerge during 
memory retrieval. Our data confirm this prediction. This experimental strategy could be 
applied to many other sensorimotor properties, in order to test for similarities between 
perception (or action) and memory processes. 
 Somewhat to our surprise, the chromaticity effect on memory was strongest in a 
very posterior region, namely the left lingual gyrus. This was the one region where we 
found direct overlap of voxels activated by both perception and memory tasks. Ventral 
temporal regions, and in particular the left fusiform gyrus, showed robust task activation 
during the knowledge retrieval task, with a peak voxel coordinate that was only 3mm 
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from the peak voxel reported by Simmons and colleagues (2007). However, the 
chromaticity effect in the left fusiform gyrus associated with the memory task was weak 
at best, and evident only as a marginally significant difference in an analysis without 
global signal in the model. These findings suggest that future research might fruitfully 
focus on possible differences between posterior (i.e., lingual) and more anterior (i.e., 
fusiform) regions of the visual system.  
 As noted, the decision to include global signal in the model did not affect the 
detection of the perceptual chromaticity effect in the left lingual region, but did have an 
impact in the left fusiform region. Often, considerations about inclusion of the global 
signal in a model are based on the correlation between the global signal covariate and the 
task covariate — because when the two are highly correlated, teasing apart the effects of 
each becomes nearly impossible (see Aguirre, Zarahn, & D’Esposito (1998) for further 
discussion). The correlation between global signal and the chromaticity covariate in the 
perceptual task ranged from 0.11-0.31 across subjects, though of course the co-linearity 
across predictors in the model is the same for the two regions in question here.  
 What could differ, however, is the correlation between the global signal and the 
regionally-specific signal. In other words, if activation in the fusiform region is more 
strongly correlated with the global signal than is activation in the lingual region, then the 
inclusion of global signal in the model could differentially affect the fusiform findings. 
This was indeed the pattern that we observed in these two regions (p < 0.01). The fact 
that global signal explains more variance in the fusiform (average t = 10.8) than in the 
lingual region (average t = 7.88) could explain why the inclusion of global signal has 
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differential effects in these two regions. 
 We find this idea interesting in light of an argument made in Beauchamp et al. 
(1999), namely that fusiform activation may depend on the attentional demands of the 
task. For example, previous work has demonstrated that the fusiform gyrus is activated 
during an attentionally demanding color perception task, but not during passive viewing 
tasks (see Beauchamp et al., 1999). In other research, we have shown that activation in 
this region during color retrieval is modulated by specificity of the color information 
required in the task (Hsu et al., 2011). If activation in the fusiform gyrus does reflect a 
more general attentional process, then it is conceivable that activity there would be 
correlated with a spatially-distributed attentional network, which could in turn lead to a 
higher correlation with global signal — because the global signal is the average of every 
voxel’s response at a given time point. More generally, this discussion highlights the 
potential value of comparing models that include or omit covariates which are generally 
considered to have “no interest.” As shown above, global signal might indeed be of 
interest. 
 Turning to the memory data, we found a strong effect of chromaticity in the 
lingual gyrus which is co-localized with the perceptual chromaticity effect, but a weak 
effect, at best, in the fusiform gyrus. We find the absence of a chromaticity effect in the 
fusiform gyrus particularly interesting, given that the memory task resulted in robust 
activation in this region. How might this area be contributing to the process of memory 
retrieval, particularly in light of its association with color perception as reviewed above? 
We think there are two plausible explanations, though we should also note with caution 
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that the interaction between chromaticity and region did not reach significance (p = 0.19), 
so we do not have evidence that the patterns we observed in fusiform and lingual regions 
are reliably different. For this reason, these ideas should be understood as suggestions for 
future research aimed at distinguishing the response properties of these regions.  
 Firstly, echoing a suggestion in Simmons et al. (2007), the posterior lingual area 
might be generating a purely sensory response to any colored stimuli, regardless of task, 
whereas the more anterior fusiform area may be more directly involved in the process of 
color categorization. The luminance judgment for our color knowledge task did not 
explicitly require subjects to categorize color stimuli, which may explain the lack of a 
robust chromaticity effect in fusiform gyrus. Hence, the two areas can be understood as 
supporting different processes that are invoked to varying degrees during different 
perceptual and memory tasks. This account leads to the testable prediction that 
chromaticity effects would be observed during a memory retrieval task that required 
greater attention to color categories. 
 A second possibility concerns the nature of the representations of different colors 
in these two regions. An area could be said to represent color, if the response in that area 
varies as a function of variation in color. One such variation would be that chromatic 
stimuli, as a group, tend to elicit a different pattern of activity (in this case, a higher 
magnitude response) than do achromatic stimuli. Observation of a chromaticity effect 
requires that within-class differences (that is, variation between different colors, among 
the chromatic stimuli, or between different shades of gray, among the achromatic stimuli) 
are smaller that the between-class differences.  
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 However, there are many possible representations of color that would not lead to a 
chromaticity effect. The fusiform region could be a “color area”, in that it codes the color 
of stimuli in both perception and memory, but one in which the difference in the 
representation of, say, purple and green stimuli is just as big as the difference between 
purple and gray stimuli. There are now methods for analyzing fMRI data that are well-
suited for characterizing pattern similarity, and which could fruitfully be applied to the 
study of color representation (e.g., Haushofer, Livingstone, & Kanwisher, 2008; O’Toole, 
Jiang, Abdi, & Haxby, 2005; Weber, Thompson-Schill, Osherson, Haxby, & Parsons, 
2009). For example, we would predict that when discriminating different categories of 
chromatic stimuli such as purple from green (in perception or memory), classification 
performance should be worse in early visual areas (e.g. lingual gyrus) than it is in 
downstream visual areas (e.g., fusiform gyrus).  
 Finally, there are two aspects of our stimulus set and task choice that warrant 
some further discussion. First, by using a luminance judgment task, the observed 
chromaticity effect might be attributed to additional processing in the chromatic 
condition. That is, by asking subjects to judge luminance, they may have needed to 
“convert” chromatic items to grayscale prior to responding. By contrast, this step is 
unnecessary for achromatic items. Thus, greater activity in the chromatic condition may 
be the result of a task-dependent process that contributed to differential activation 
between chromatic and achromatic knowledge retrieval. Second, chromatic items might 
sample a larger area of color space than achromatic items. That is, the colors of 
achromatic items were always either white, gray, or black. Chromatic items, by contrast, 
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were sampled from any colors except for white, gray, or black. Further, to better match 
conditions in terms of RT, we intentionally constructed some achromatic pairs to be 
closer in terms of perceived luminance (e.g., a luminance judgment for CHALK-KNIFE 
is more difficult than for CHALK-PIANO), and we constructed some chromatic pairs to 
be further apart in terms of perceived luminance (e.g., a luminance judgment for 
SCHOOL BUS-FUDGE is easier than for SCHOOL BUS-BASKETBALL).  
 As a result, no trials in either condition used two items from the same color family 
(e.g., two red items). Thus, our reported effects may be the result of a larger color space 
sampling in the chromatic condition, relative to the achromatic condition. A future study 
could control for color space variance in the two conditions by asking luminance of two 
red items (e.g., STRAWBERRY-BRICK) versus luminance of two gray items (e.g., 
CONCRETE-QUARTER). 
 In summary, our study is the first to examine whether a well-established 
difference in the perception of chromatic and achromatic stimuli is paralleled during 
memory retrieval, in the absence of any visual information. These results provide 
evidence supporting sensorimotor models of semantic memory, by demonstrating 
commonalities between color perception and color knowledge in early areas of the 
cortical visual system. More importantly, our findings show that there may be multiple 
areas of overlap between perception and memory, though the functions of those areas 
may be distinct. The chromaticity effect described here may tap into some of these 
functional differences, and future research may elucidate some of these distinctions 
further.
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Table 2.2. List of stimuli used in the color knowledge retrieval task. 
Abstract Chromatic Achromatic 
boredom-passion brandy-dandelion grill-cream 
torque-hope biscuit-marinara skunk-vanilla 
confidence-irritation leaf-tabasco flute-poppy seed 
liberty-wrath emerald -moose steel-rabbit 
genius-atrocity pool table-daffodil soap-dime 
sin-fidelity broom-windex envelope-tire 
vanity-evidence desk-honeydew fly-pin 
tyranny-safety balloon-trombone mayonnaise-concrete 
pact-fraud oak-rubber ducky rhinoceros-soot 
effort-banality gums-bison knife-marshmallow 
antagonism-joy plum-relish dalmatian-paste 
adultery-beauty beaver-pear pillow-paperclip 
fission-trust denim-lemon bone-raven 
penalty-sanctuary broccoli-egg yolk dolphin-onion 
etiquette-panic monkey-mint scissors-milk 
frenzy-discourse peanut-zucchini aluminum-porcelain 
humor-sin cheese-iced tea needle-paper 
dogma-wisdom tiger-pretzel penguin-rice 
tragedy-friendship highlighter-log flour-thimble 
brutality-savant butter-violin baseball-ebony 
banquet-anxiety seaweed-trumpet cigarette-stone 
welcome-fear saxophone-tomato armor-cauliflower 
harm-glory cigar-sunflower cement-garlic 
hindrance-insight cranberry-latte fork-salt 
danger-salvation apricot-wood crow-spoon 
strength-upheaval stool-taxi  eggshell-whale 
haven-regret lemonade-garden hose hubcap-dove 
enactment-sorrow bee-fire truck sail-eight ball 
annoyance-talent sun-tortoise pliers-sheep 
romance-ego jeans-canary manatee-pearl 
reason-indolence chocolate-guacamole cotton-elephant 
ridicule-dynasty barrel-cabbage beetle-sword 
equality-complexity apple-pencil hearse-lab coat 
greed-delight mango-scotch whistle-piano 
hostility-idol fudge-ham alfredo-snow 
virtue-poverty cantaloupe-deer ivory-tack 
envy-amusement chili-yam cloud-staple 
paradigm-threat kiwi-barn cue ball -panther 
livelihood-misery tuba-wreath swan-radio 
rigidity-fervour gingersnap-ocean screw-stork 
tradition-wish heart-chick yogurt-quarter 
success-malice basketball-celery glue-tuxedo 
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Abstract Chromatic Achromatic 
luck-woe football-mustard wrench-oil 
skill-grief cello-corn lamb-limousine 
unrest-tact leather-salmon napkin-tin 
aptitude-revenge brownie-salsa sugar-shield 
relief-fallacy pea-cherry gun-golf ball 
sanitation-mischief pumpkin-table shark-spider 
triumph-suspicion brick-bubblegum treadmill-refrigerator 
liberty-spite highlighter-shamrock oil-paper 
skill-irritation dandelion-tomato rhinoceros-envelope 
indolence-haven  broom-chick gun-refrigerator 
hope-fraud peanut-saxophone steel-snow 
grief-idol  apricot-gingersnap spider-dolphin 
wrath-virtue barn-sun armor-salt 
banquet-strength oak-denim treadmill-thimble 
sanitation-fear monkey-trumpet tin-cue ball 
adultery-livelihood cardboard-tuba hubcap-dove 
unrest-sanctuary pencil-cigar soot-shark 
humor-regret cello-gums knife-flour 
annoyance-safety salsa-football pliers-lab coat 
envy-deity balloon-moose crow-yogurt 
torque-woe mustard-wreath whistle-mayonnaise 
fission-glory emerald-leather eight ball-onion 
tyranny-wish butter-fudge dime-cream 
genius-ego rubber ducky-brandy flute-milk 
rigidity-talent biscuit-brick quarter-dalmatian 
enactment-confidence cabbage-chili grill-soap 
ridicule-fervour tabasco-log raven-pillow 
banality-evidence celery-table stone-stork 
luck-threat guacamole-beaver screw-lamb 
penalty-beauty barrel-salmon poppy seed-chain 
hostility-pact relish-fire truck whale-paste 
success-complexity brownie-yam penguin-wrench 
aptitude-suspicion marinara-plum spoon-glue 
equality-dynasty deer-cherry  beetle-sugar 
harm-savant ham-sunflower panther-cement 
friendship-vanity chocolate-pear radio-pearl 
passion-danger iced tea-cantaloupe scissors-cloud 
effort-malice scotch-honeydew aluminum-cotton 
salvation-fraud violin-egg yolk concrete-cauliflower 
frenzy-etiquette taxi cab-wood ebony-rice 
panic-romance heart-bee tuxedo-pin 
dogma-tact desk-tiger hearse-porcelain 
wisdom-poverty pumpkin-windex manatee-eggshell 
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Abstract Chromatic Achromatic 
anxiety-tradition mint-ocean needle-marshmallow 
upheaval-discourse basketball-broccoli fork-garlic 
reason-sin latte-apple elephant-vanilla 
hindrance-amusement seaweed-mango tire-sheep 
paradigm-boredom toast-canary fly-alfredo 
tragedy-insight garden hose-pretzel staple-napkin 
greed-joy cranberry-lemon limousine-sail 
triumph-revenge leaf-corn lead-bone 
fidelity-brutality stool-cheese sword-ivory 
welcome-mischief jeans-zucchini piano-rabbit 
delight-fallacy pea-daffodil paperclip-baseball 
relief-antagonism trombone-pool table tack-cigarette 
sorrow-trust tortoise-bubblegum shield-golf ball 
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Table 2.3. Regions identified from the 27 maxima in the exploratory, whole-brain 
analysis. Coordinates are in Talairach space and are given for the peak voxel (local 
maximum) with corresponding t-value. Regions were labeled by visual inspection. Note 
that these t-values denote response to chromatic versus achromatic perceptual stimuli, 
whereas the differences in signal changes plotted in Figure 2.4 denote response to 
chromatic versus achromatic conceptual stimuli. 
 
Region X coor Y coor Z coor Peak t Value 
L Postcentral Gyrus -53 -29 52 4.06 
R Supramarginal Gyrus 45 -21 41 5.57 
R Superior Parietal Gyrus 12 -85 40 4.95 
L Superior Parietal Gyrus -9 -83 37 5.34 
Superior Parietal Gyrus 0 -83 32 5.13 
Precuneus 0 -77 32 4.99 
R Superior Parietal Gyrus 9 -92 30 7.51 
L Superior Parietal Gyrus -18 -92 27 6.06 
R Superior Occipital Gyrus 27 -92 22 4.32 
R Cuneus 12 -89 22 8.36 
L Cuneus -6 -89 22 4.65 
L Superior Occipital Gyrus -6 -98 20 6.46 
L Superior Occipital Gyrus -18 -98 18 7.88 
L Superior Occipital Gyrus -15 -101 10 4.72 
Cuneus 0 -87 9 7.67 
R Cuneus 9 -102 8 5.06 
L Cuneus -3 -99 7 4.63 
R Cuneus 3 -96 7 4.94 
L Lingual Gyrus -9 -87 4 8.60 
L Parahippocampal Gyrus -12 -41 0 4.89 
L Superior Lingual Gyrus -9 -91 -8 4.50 
R Inferior Lingual Gyrus 15 -76 -9 5.22 
R Inferior Lingual Gyrus 33 -73 -9 6.21 
L Inferior Lingual Gyrus -15 -70 -9 4.44 
L Inferior Lingual Gyrus -9 -79 -11 5.35 
L Fusiform Gyrus -27 -65 -12 4.73 
R Fusiform Gyrus 30 -62 -15 5.68 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 2.1. Examples of stimuli from each task. (top) For the color knowledge task, 
subjects made a luminance judgment on named pairs of chromatic or achromatic objects. 
As a baseline, subjects made goodness judgments on pairs of abstract concepts. (bottom) 
For the color perception task, subjects judged whether the wedges making up a chromatic 
or achromatic wheel were sequentially ordered from lightest to darkest. 
 
Figure 2.2. Co-localization of color perception and color knowledge. We independently 
identified the 50 most active voxels in posterior occipital regions for color perception 
(red) and color knowledge (blue). Voxels active for both tasks are shown in green. 
 
Figure 2.3. Exploratory analyses. (top) Group random-effects whole-brain analysis 
shows voxels responding more to chromatic than achromatic visual stimuli at p < 0.001 
(uncorrected) threshold. (bottom) Group random-effects whole brain analysis shows 
voxels responding more to chromatic that achromatic conceptual knowledge at p < 0.01 
(uncorrected) threshold. The 27 fROIs were identified within these active regions. 
 
Figure 2.4. Signal change trends in ventral but not dorsal regions. For each of the 27 
fROIs identified in the exploratory whole-brain analysis, we assessed percent signal 
change by comparing each condition of the color knowledge task to baseline. We then 
subtracted the values from achromatic from chromatic, and plotted the difference. All 
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ventral color perception regions showed greater response to chromatic than achromatic 
knowledge retrieval, but this pattern was not consistently observed in dorsal regions that 
were involved in the color perception task. Note that these values correspond to activity 
during the conceptual task, and coordinates are plotted in order from dorsal to ventral 
according to Talairach z-coordinates. For full Talairach coordinate listings, 
corresponding regions, and t-values of these maxima to the perceptual task, see Table 2.3. 
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Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.4. 
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CHAPTER 3: Color, context, and cognitive style: variations in color knowledge 
retrieval as a function of task and subject variables 
 
Hsu, N. S., Kraemer, D. J. M., Oliver, R. T., Schlichting, M. L., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. 
(2011). Color, context, and cognitive style: variations in color knowledge retrieval as a 
function of task and subject variables. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(9), 2544-
2557. 
 
Abstract 
Neuroimaging tests of sensorimotor theories of semantic memory hinge on the extent to 
which similar activation patterns are observed during perception and retrieval of objects 
or object properties. The present study was motivated by the hypothesis that some of the 
seeming discrepancies across prior studies of semantic memory related to color properties 
may reflect flexibility in the systems responsible for conceptual and perceptual 
processing of color. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that retrieval of color knowledge 
can be influenced by both context, which is a task variable, and individual differences in 
cognitive style, which are a subject variable. In Experiment 1, we provide fMRI evidence 
for differential activity during color knowledge retrieval, by having subjects perform a 
verbal task in which context encouraged them to retrieve more- or less-detailed 
information about the colors of named common objects in a blocked experimental design. 
We found greater activity in the left fusiform gyrus during retrieval of color knowledge 
with a higher level of detail. We also assessed preference for verbal or visual cognitive 
style, and found that brain activity in the left lingual gyrus significantly correlated with 
preference for a visual cognitive style. In Experiment 2, stimuli were presented more 
quickly, in a random order, and in the auditory modality, and we were able to replicate 
many of the effects from Experiment 1. This illustration of some of the factors that can 
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influence color knowledge retrieval leads to the conclusion that tests of conceptual and 
perceptual overlap should consider variation in both of these processes.  
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Introduction 
Sensorimotor theories of semantic memory posit that object knowledge is 
organized in a distributed, modality-specific fashion, and is stored in or near the brain 
regions that are associated with perception of and action with objects (Allport, 1985; 
Barsalou, 1999; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). A large body of behavioral, 
neuroimaging, and neurophysiological research has provided evidence for these theories 
(for review, see Martin, 2007 or Thompson-Schill, 2003). In particular, neuroimaging 
studies have demonstrated that retrieving knowledge of object features draws on similar 
neural substrates as perception in the same modality, as shown through vision (Chao & 
Martin, 1999; Kosslyn et al., 1995; Martin et al., 1995; Simmons et al., 2007), hearing 
(Hughes et al., 2001; Kraemer et al., 2005; Wheeler et al., 2000; Yoo et al., 2001), and 
action (Chao & Martin, 2000; Hauk et al., 2004; Kellenbach et al., 2003; Oliver et al., 
2009; Yee et al., 2010). 
The current investigation focuses on vision, and in particular color vision. Color is 
crucial to object identification, is often the feature used to distinguish between two 
otherwise similar objects (e.g., lemons and limes), and can be characterized by both 
continuous values along multiple dimensions (such as hue, saturation, and luminance), or 
more coarsely in a categorical fashion. Moreover, color is a feature that is only perceived 
through the visual modality, unlike other features of object appearance such as shape or 
size.  
The methods used in prior research on color perception and color retrieval have 
varied widely, as have the results of those investigations. Brain regions sensitive to color 
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perception have been identified through the use of passively viewed colored versus 
grayscale Mondrians (Chao & Martin, 1999; Howard et al., 1998), or while making 
luminance judgments on visual stimuli (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Simmons et al., 2007). 
While active brain regions tend to include lateralized or bilateral fusiform and lingual 
gyri, as yet there is no overwhelming consensus on which brain areas are most closely 
involved in color perception. Tasks used to identify the brain regions involved in retrieval 
of color knowledge have included a similarity task of two named objects in the same 
color family (Howard et al., 1998), naming colors of objects presented as achromatic line 
drawings (Chao & Martin, 1999; Martin et al., 1995), or verifying colors of objects 
(Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2001; Simmons et al., 2007). In addition to lateralized or 
bilateral fusiform and lingual gyri being active, a posterior inferior temporal network can 
also be activated during retrieval (Kellenbach et al., 2001). The results from prior 
research have generally been interpreted as evidence supporting sensorimotor theories of 
semantic memory, but there are discrepancies among studies which might undermine this 
conclusion. For example, one study found no evidence of overlapping responses to color 
perception and color retrieval (Chao & Martin, 1999), while another analysis found direct 
overlap between the two, albeit only in the left fusiform gyrus (Simmons et al., 2007).  
 Past work investigating the semantic memory attributes of color has tended to 
investigate the overlap between conceptual and perceptual color processing by posing the 
question: “Does color knowledge retrieval activate the color perception area?” Instead, 
we propose reframing the question as: “What factors influence color knowledge retrieval, 
and under what circumstances do these factors influence the extent of overlap between 
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color knowledge retrieval and color perception?" We propose that differences in the 
literature may also be partly due to external influences on retrieval of color knowledge, 
namely task factors and individual factors.  
 To motivate the relevance of task, or context, factors for color retrieval, consider 
the following two contexts. First, imagine that you are trying to avoid eating strawberries 
as you pick through a fruit salad comprising blueberries, blackberries, and strawberries. 
As you plan your search of the bowl of fruit, you will need to know that the strawberries 
are the red bits in the bowl. Now instead, imagine that you are trying to avoid eating the 
strawberries in a fruit salad that also includes raspberries, watermelon, and cherries. 
Dodging the red pieces will no longer help you, and instead, you need to recall the 
specific shade of red of the strawberry. In other words, the context (created by the other 
fruits in the bowl) changes the type of color information you retrieve about the fruits. 
This is the contextual difference that we have attempted to capture with our task 
manipulation. 
 Turning to individual factors, differences in cognitive style may also play an 
important role in the representation that is retrieved by a given individual. A cognitive 
style is a psychological dimension that represents consistencies in how an individual 
acquires and processes information (Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shephard, 2005). 
Different individuals process certain types of information differently, for instance by 
having a preference for learning through pictures or through words, and this idea has 
been incorporated into many theories in various avenues of psychological research (for 
review, see Kozhevnikov, 2007; Kraemer, Rosenberg, & Thompson-Schill, 2009). For 
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the experiments described in this study, we use the Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire 
(VVQ) (Kirby, Moore, & Schofield, 1988) to identify propensities for visual or verbal 
cognition. A key difference between task factors and individual factors is that the latter, 
such as visualizing preferences, are described as being stable over time, whereas the 
former can vary on a trial-to-trial basis. Both of these types of factors may affect 
components of the color knowledge retrieval process, suggesting that it may be more 
dynamic and complicated than had previously been believed.  
 For the current investigation, we examined the effects of task factors and 
individual factors on color retrieval by implicitly varying the retrieval context and by 
assessing individual preferences for cognitive style. In Experiment 1, subjects performed 
a verbal task in which they judged the color similarity of three named objects. The 
composition of the object groups encouraged retrieval of either object colors from the 
same color category (e.g. three red items) or from different color categories (e.g. two red 
items and a yellow item). These object groups were thus meant to encourage retrieval of 
more- or less-detailed color knowledge. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), we measured brain activity during retrieval, controlling for difficulty by co-
varying out reaction time. We observed effects of both task factors and individual factors, 
although in different regions: We found that activity in the left fusiform gyrus was 
significantly greater when retrieving and discriminating object colors from the same 
versus different color category. The lingual gyrus was responsive to the task (compared 
to baseline), but there was no significant difference in activity between conditions. 
However, activity in this region (and task performance) significantly correlated with 
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visual cognitive style preference, as measured by the self-reported Verbalizer-Visualizer 
Questionnaire (VVQ). 
 Experiment 2 sought to replicate and extend the results of Experiment 1. For this 
test, we also varied the level of detail required for color knowledge, while also making 
two important changes to the experimental procedures. First, we used auditory rather than 
visual stimuli, to ensure that any effects were solely due to the retrieval of visual 
knowledge, and did not result from response to the visually-presented words. Second, we 
used a randomized rather than blocked manipulation of the color task, in order to 
minimize the contribution of state effects on the retrieval process. Even with these 
changes, Experiment 2 replicated many of the findings of Experiment 1, most notably by 
showing activation in the left fusiform gyrus. Additionally, there was a significant 
positive correlation between the self-reported VVQ and task performance. Overall, our 
findings in Experiments 1 and 2 support the notion that retrieval of color knowledge 
representations relies on neural substrates which are similar to those used in color 
perception, and also that the degree to which these systems overlap can be influenced 
both by context and by cognitive style. 
 
Experiment 1: Methods 
Participants 
 For Experiment 1, twelve healthy subjects (6 males, average age = 22.8 years, 
range = 19–30 years) participated. All subjects in both experiments provided written 
informed consent to participate and received monetary compensation in return for their 
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participation. The human subjects review board at the University of Pennsylvania 
approved all experimental procedures.  
 
Materials  
 For each trial of both experiments, subjects judged the similarity of three named 
objects, indicating which of the two objects was more similar to the third object in terms 
of color. The conditions of interest were varied, such that in order to arrive at a correct 
answer, varying levels of detailed color information would be required. For some tests, 
we required subjects to compare objects drawn from different color categories, or 
between-color categories (BCC), for instance by comparing PAPRIKA and PENCIL to 
LADYBUG, where less-detailed color information would suffice. For other trials, we 
required subjects to compare objects drawn from the same color category, or within-color 
category (WCC), for instance by comparing BUTTER and EGG YOLK to SCHOOL 
BUS, where more-detailed color information becomes necessary. 
The 300 objects used in the experiments were rated for color agreement (> 66%) 
by an independent group of 50 subjects, drawn from the same population as the study 
sample. Further, in order to alleviate ambiguity in WCC trials and to create WCC trials 
with agreement for the correct answer, these 50 subjects performed an additional rating 
task. For this task, they rated the color similarity of pairs of all objects within a color 
category, and WCC trials were created by pairing two objects (rated for high color 
similarity) with a third object (rated for low color similarity). Once created, the trials in 
both conditions of interest were normed in an independent group of 25 subjects for 
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accuracy and differences in response time (RT). 
Because a substantial portion of the objects used in these experiments did not 
have listings in the MRC Psycholinguistic Database (Wilson, 1987), as prioritizing for 
high color agreement constrained our object names list, we felt that the conditions could 
not be accurately matched in terms of familiarity and lexical frequency. Thus, we used a 
lexical decision task (in which all of the words referred to concrete objects) as a proxy 
measure of familiarity and frequency, as has been used in similar contexts for prior 
research (Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006). A separate set of 25 subjects drawn 
from the same population as the study sample completed the lexical decision task, during 
which they verified whether each presented word referred to a real world object or not. 
Each of the 300 words used in the neuroimaging experiments was randomly presented 
individually, and intermixed with 300 pronounceable pseudowords (Rastle, Harrington, 
& Coltheart, 2002) that were matched with the 300 real words for letter length and 
number of syllables. RT and accuracy measures were collected, which did not differ 
across the two conditions of interest. To sum, in Experiment 1, the conditions were 
matched for lexical frequency and familiarity (as measured by lexical decision RTs), 
number of letters, number of phonemes, number of syllables, and color agreement.  
No more than one week before the scanning session, subjects came to the lab to 
fill out relevant paperwork, provide informed consent, and to become acquainted with the 
tasks by performing practice versions. Additionally, they were administered the 
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ), in a manner identical to that reported 
previously (Kraemer et al., 2009).  
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Procedure, Experiment 1:  
At the beginning of each trial, two words appeared at the bottom of the screen for 
4000 msec, and then a third word replaced a fixation cross at the top of the screen (see 
Figure 1). At this point, the subjects’ task was to decide which of the two bottom words 
was more similar in real world color to the top word. Subjects indicated their response 
with a button press within a 4500 msec response window, during which time all three 
words were visible. We collected response latencies to include as a covariate in all fMRI 
analyses, in order to control for differences in time on task across conditions. At the end 
of the trial, a fixation cross appeared in the center of the screen for 500 msec, before the 
onset of the next trial, for a total trial duration of 9000 msec. 
Trials from the WCC and BCC conditions were blocked in Experiment 1 as 
follows: we presented 5 trials of one condition (45 sec) followed by 45 seconds of 
fixation (“baseline”), and then 5 trials of the other condition followed by 45 seconds of 
fixation, and so on. In each of two functional scans (or runs), subjects completed 5 WCC 
blocks and 5 BCC blocks, for a total of 50 trials per conditions across the two scans, with 
an equivalent amount of fixation time. To reduce variability across subjects associated 
with task order, trials were presented in the same order for all subjects, beginning with a 
WCC block. Prior to scanning, subjects completed five practice trials of each condition. 
We used E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) to present stimuli and to 
collect response data. 
After subjects completed both color retrieval scans, we administered a “functional 
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localizer” in order to identify brain regions involved in color perception, so that we could 
compare regions that are affected by task or subject factors during color retrieval to 
regions that respond to color perception in the same group of subjects. Participants saw 
blocks of the Farnsworth-Munsell 100-hue stimuli, in which they judged whether 
chromatic or achromatic color wheels were sequentially ordered from lightest to darkest. 
The methods and stimuli for this task were identical to those that were used previously by 
Simmons and colleagues (Simmons et al., 2007) and have previously been used to 
identify brain regions involved in color perception (e.g., Beauchamp et al., 1999). 
 
Image Acquisition  
 We acquired imaging data using a 3T Siemens Trio system with an 8-channel 
head coil and foam padding to secure the head in position. After we acquired T1-
weighted anatomical images (TR = 1620 msec, TE = 3 msec, TI = 950 msec, voxel size = 
0.9766 mm x 0.9766 mm x 1.000 mm), each subject performed the color knowledge 
retrieval task, followed by the color perception task, while undergoing blood oxygen 
dependent (BOLD) imaging (Ogawa et al., 1993). We collected 912 sets of 42 slices 
using interleaved, gradient echo, echoplanar imaging (TR = 3000 msec, TE = 30 msec, 
FOV = 19.2 cm x 19.2 cm, voxel size = 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm). At least 9 seconds 
of “dummy” gradient and radio frequency pulses preceded each functional scan to allow 
for steady-state magnetization; no stimuli were presented and no fMRI data were 
collected during this initial time period.  
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Neuroimaging Data Analysis 
 We analyzed the data off-line using VoxBo (www.voxbo.org) and SPM2 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Anatomical data for each subject were processed using the 
FMRIB Software Library (FSL) toolkit (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) to correct for 
spatial inhomogeneities and to perform non-linear noise reduction. Functional data were 
sinc interpolated in time to correct for the slice acquisition sequence; motion corrected 
with a six-parameter, least squares, rigid body realignment routine using the first 
functional image as a reference; and normalized in SPM2 to a standard template in 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. The fMRI data were smoothed using a 
9mm full-width half-max (FWHM) Gaussian smoothing kernel. Following preprocessing 
for each subject, a power spectrum for one functional run was fit with a 1/frequency 
function, and this model was used to estimate the intrinsic temporal autocorrelation of the 
functional data (Zarahn et al., 1997). 
 We fit a modified general linear model (Worsley & Friston, 1995) to each 
subject’s data, in which the conditions of interest were modeled as a block and convolved 
with a standard hemodynamic response function. Several covariates of no interest (global 
signal, scan effects, movement spikes) were included in the model. The response latency 
for each trial was also included as a covariate of no interest, to address any confounds of 
difficulty or “time on task”; in other words, effects of condition reported below describe 
differences between conditions that cannot be explained by RT differences alone. From 
this model, we computed parameter estimates for each condition (compared to baseline) 
at each voxel. These parameter estimates were included in the group-level random effects 
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analyses described below.  
To establish functionally defined regions of interest (fROIs) in which to assess the 
effects of task and individual factors on color retrieval, we first performed a group-level 
random effects analysis, in which we compared brain activity for both conditions of 
interest to the fixation baseline. Note that, because the fROIs are defined in this way, they 
are unbiased with regard to the test of interest, namely whether there are differences in 
activation between the two conditions. Next, from the set of fROIs that emerged from this 
analysis, we identified the peak cluster of voxels from lingual and fusiform gyri, as these 
two regions have been implicated in color perception and color knowledge retrieval 
(Beauchamp et al., 1999; Chao & Martin, 1999; Martin, 2007; Simmons et al., 2007). In 
order to create fROIs of comparable size across regions, we did not use a pre-determined 
threshold, but instead adjusted the threshold that yielded approximately 100 maximally-
responsive voxels in each of these regions. (For the remaining fROIs about which we did 
not have a priori hypotheses, we assessed effects using an approach better suited for 
exploratory analyses, which we discuss in the section titled “Exploratory whole-brain 
analyses” below.) Finally, within each of these fROIs, we calculated parameter estimates 
for each subject, for each condition, on the spatially-averaged time series (across the 100 
voxels in the fROI), and used these parameter estimates to assess the effects of task and 
individual factors on color retrieval (see Figure 4). Task effects were assessed using a 
paired t-test of the difference between the WCC parameter and the BCC parameter, and 
subject effects were assessed using a Pearson’s correlation between these values and the 
difference scores on the VVQ. 
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Experiment 1: Results 
Behavioral Results 
Each dimension of the VVQ ranges from -20 to 20. Although scores for each 
dimension were generally positive, we measured preference for a visual or verbal 
cognitive style in terms of the difference between the two, calculated by subtracting 
verbal from visual scores. This difference score will be reported throughout the paper as 
“Vis-Verb.” Difference scores ranged from -5 to 15 (M = 4.3, SD = 7.15).  
The average response time (RT, in ms) for correct trials in both experimental 
conditions was 1485.08 (SD = 678.66). As expected, the inherent difference in difficulty 
between the two experimental conditions resulted in notable RT differences (BCC: M = 
1332.25, SD = 651.91; WCC: M = 1720.17, SD = 669.27; t(11) = 4.74, p < 0.001). Vis-
Verb scores were not correlated with RT (r = -0.38, p = 0.20). Accuracy across 
conditions was fairly high (84%), but lower for the more difficult WCC condition (BCC: 
95%; WCC: 74%; t(11) = 13.40, p < 0.001). As seen in Figure 3a, accuracy difference 
scores (calculated by subtracting accuracy on the BCC trials from the WCC trials) 
significantly correlated with Vis-Verb scores (r = 0.58, p < 0.05). This result suggests 
that subjects who prefer the visual cognitive style tended to perform better on trials in 
which object representations of higher detail were retrieved.  
 
Imaging Results 
 Results are shown in Figure 4a. In the left fusiform region (100 voxels; t = 6.96, 
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Talairach coordinates: -36, -47, -13, BA 37), activation was significantly greater during 
WCC blocks (mean % signal change = 0.53 %, SD = 0.208 %) than during BCC blocks 
(mean % signal change = 0.40 %, SD = 0.14 %; t(11) = 4.02, p = 0.002). A weak but non-
significant positive correlation also existed between the magnitude of the condition effect 
(calculated as the difference in signal change between the two conditions) and Vis-Verb 
scores (r = 0.35, p = 0.13). The finding of task-dependent levels of activity in the left 
fusiform region during color retrieval tends to support our hypothesis that context can 
influence the color knowledge retrieval process. 
 In the left lingual region (119 voxels; t = 5.5, Talairach coordinates: -15, -85, -3, 
BA 18), there was significant activation in both conditions, but no difference between 
conditions (WCC: mean = 0.28 %, SD = 0.16 %; BCC: mean = 0.29 %, SD = 0.14 %; 
t(11) = -0.28, p = 0.83). Although there was not a reliable main effect of condition, there 
was a significant positive correlation (see Figure 3c, r = 0.56, p = 0.03) between the 
magnitude of the main effect and the Vis-Verb scores: Participants who preferred the 
visual cognitive style showed higher levels of activation in the left lingual region, during 
trials requiring retrieval of more-detailed color information. The finding that activity in 
the left lingual region is correlated with an individual’s cognitive style supports our 
hypothesis that individual factors can influence retrieval of color knowledge 
representations. 
 
Additional Analyses 
A separate analysis investigated the overlap between color perception and color 
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knowledge retrieval, by identifying ROIs of approximately 100 active voxels during the 
color perception localizer in the same manner described for the color retrieval fROIs. 
This method yielded two ROIs in the left fusiform (t = 5.05; 102 voxels) and the left 
lingual gyrus (t = 6.5, 110 voxels). We then assessed the extent to which the regions 
involved in color perception were also involved in the color knowledge task, by 
overlaying the color perception ROIs with the color knowledge ROIs described above. 
Here, we found that voxels involved in both color perception and color knowledge 
retrieval overlapped in both left fusiform gyrus (10 voxels; Figure 5a) and left lingual 
gyrus (2 voxels; Figure 5b). When we repeated our analyses of task and subject effects in 
the regions which had been functionally defined to be involved in color perception, there 
was a marginally significant increase for WCC versus BCC trials (t[11] = 2.20, p = 
0.084), though the correlation between Vis-Verb scores and brain activity was not 
statistically significant. 
Separately, we also conducted an exploratory whole-brain analysis. Using a 
group-level random effects analysis, we identified all clusters that surpassed a p < 0.001 
(uncorrected) threshold for the task-baseline contrast (for clusters greater than 100 
voxels, we picked only the peak 100 voxels, in order to maintain consistency with the 
approach described above). This analysis revealed thirteen additional fROIs, and we 
tested significance of the WCC-BCC contrast in each of those fROIs, as well as the 
correlation of brain activity with Vis-Verb scores. These regions are reported in Table 1. 
As can be seen, several other regions which were activated during color retrieval — 
beyond those selected for their involvement in color perception — were also modulated 
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by task and subject factors. 
 
Experiment 1: Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 provide evidence that task factors (context) and 
individual factors (here, cognitive style), influence conceptual processing of color. 
Activation during the color retrieval task was observed in two regions — the left fusiform 
gyrus and the left lingual gyrus — that have already been reported in prior research on 
color perception and memory, and which also overlapped with regions activated by our 
color perception localizer in the same group of subjects. In these two regions, we found 
evidence of effects of both task factors and individual factors. Specifically, in the left 
fusiform region, we observed greater activation when color knowledge was retrieved in a 
context that requires detailed or specific color information (i.e., WCC blocks) than in one 
that does not (i.e., BCC blocks). And, in the left lingual region, the magnitude of this 
effect was correlated with the degree to which subjects preferred the visual cognitive 
style.  
These findings paint a picture of color retrieval as a dynamic process, which can 
vary according to both state and trait factors. The overlap between our two regions of 
interest with voxels that respond to color perception (Figure 5) raises the possibility that 
one aspect of color retrieval that varies is the extent to which early perceptual processes 
are recruited during memory retrieval. Furthermore, we found that subjects who report a 
visual cognitive style did better on WCC trials than those who did not; this result 
suggests that there can be behavioral consequences of these variations in color retrieval 
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processes. Lastly, and more generally, these findings illustrate the utility of using both 
group and individual analyses, a point to which we return in the General Discussion.  
Early visual cortex has been shown to be recruited when retrieving high-
resolution details of object surface geometry (Kosslyn & Thompson, 2003). However, to 
our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that retrieval of color knowledge 
representations can differentially activate areas of the visual cortex that are also involved 
in color perception. However, there is an alternative explanation of our findings in 
Experiment 1, which focuses on our decision to present verbal stimuli in the visual 
modality: The differences we observed between the WCC and BCC conditions could be 
explained by a low-level, perceptual explanation unrelated to our hypothesis, if subjects 
were scanning the visually-presented words differently during the two conditions — for 
instance, if the WCC condition resulted in multiple fixations on each word, but the BCC 
condition did not. In other words, although our general linear model statistically 
controlled for response time differences, we cannot be certain that the same amount of 
visual processing occurred per unit time. Experiment 2 addressed this concern by 
presenting auditory rather than visual stimuli, so we could be certain that activation in 
visual areas did not reflect processing of the words per se, but instead was indeed 
focusing on the objects to which the words refer.  
In Experiment 2, in addition to replicating our initial findings in the auditory 
modality, we also wanted to address the time course of dynamic changes in knowledge 
retrieval. In Experiment 1, subjects were presented with 45-second blocks that alternated 
between retrieval of more- or less-detailed color knowledge representations. Thus, the 
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results of Experiment 1 could reflect an anticipatory strategy sustained across an entire 
block. In Experiment 2, we randomized the order of conditions on a trial-by-trial basis, 
such that subjects were unable to predict the type of knowledge that would be required 
prior to each trial. We also reduced each trial’s duration, in order to reduce the potential 
impact of post-decision processes. Therefore, unlike in Experiment 1 where condition 
differences could have been present even in the inter-trial interval of each block, in 
Experiment 2 any observed differences in activation between conditions presumably 
reflect the response to each individual set of stimuli. 
 
Experiment 2: Methods 
Participants 
 For Experiment 2, twelve healthy subjects (6 males, average age = 22.9 years, 
range = 19–27 years) participated. No subjects participated in both experiments.  
 
Materials 
 We selected 25 trials from each condition of Experiment 1 for use in Experiment 
2. The items in the two conditions were matched for lexical frequency and familiarity (as 
measured by lexical decision RTs), number of phonemes, and color agreement. Auditory 
stimuli were recorded using Audacity (version 1.2.5) and filtered for noise. Because of 
the inherent difficulty of hearing intelligible words above scanner noise made while 
acquiring functional images, we modified sound files with a Matlab tool that boosts 
sound frequencies normally masked by fMRI noise. Behavioral piloting of both file types 
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revealed that the modified sound files were more intelligible than the original sound files. 
To further facilitate word recognition in the scanner, subjects listened to all of the words 
prior to scanning (once each, in a random order), and were told they would hear these 
words again during the scan. They also generated the typical colors of these objects, and 
naming latencies (as a proxy of familiarity for the scanned subjects) were compared 
across the conditions of interest. There were no significant differences in naming 
latencies across these conditions. 
 
Procedure, Experiment 2:  
 On each trial, subjects heard three words and were instructed to decide which of 
the first two named objects (spoken in a female voice) was more similar in color to the 
third named object (spoken in a male voice). The trial structure, illustrated in Figure 2, 
was as follows: At the beginning of each trial, a “READY?” prompt appeared on the 
screen for 250 msec. Subjects then heard the names of three objects (the words’ onsets 
were 1000 msec apart). Simultaneously with the onset of the third word, a visual prompt 
of “COLOR?” appeared, and subjects had 3650 msec to respond with a button press. 
Subjects were also told to press a third button if the words in a given triad were 
unintelligible due to scanner noise, so we could eliminate those trials from our analyses. 
The intertrial interval was 100 msec.  
 Each subject completed three scanning runs of the color retrieval task (6-7 
minutes each), with 8 or 9 trials of each condition per run. We presented a unique trial 
order to each subject, using Optseq2 (http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq) to 
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generate optimized pseudo-random stimulus presentation sequences. Experimental trials 
were intermixed with jittered fixation periods averaging 6 seconds in length. (These trials 
were also intermixed with filler trials on which subjects made judgments unrelated to 
object color, which were not further analyzed.)  
 Additionally, the list of 300 objects contained four homophones (JEANS, PEA, 
THYME, DOE) that when heard rather than seen, could potentially result in ambiguity 
irrelevant for the task of interest. Thus, for Experiment 2, during acquisition of 
anatomical images (and before functional imaging), each of the 300 words was visually 
presented on the screen for 1000 msec. The words were randomly presented across 
subjects, but the homophones always came first. Subjects were told that these words were 
being presented to refresh their memories of the objects that would come up during the 
task, and they were instructed to read each word silently to themselves.  
 The “functional localizer” to identify brain regions involved in color perception 
was administered after the color knowledge task, exactly as in Experiment 1. All image 
acquisition parameters were as in Experiment 1, although fewer volumes were collected 
(693) and the overall duration of the experiment was shorter. Behavioral and functional 
data were analyzed as in Experiment 1, except that we modeled each trial as a separate 
event with a 6-second duration. 
 
Experiment 2: Results 
Behavioral Results 
 Vis-Verb scores ranged from -11 to 13 (M = 1.5, SD = 8.07) and did not differ 
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from Experiment 1 scores (p = 0.37). The pattern of performance on the WCC and BCC 
trials resembled that of Experiment 1: There was a small but still reliable difference 
between conditions in RTs to correct trials (BCC: M = 1898.42, SD = 246.10; WCC: M = 
2109.38, SD = 322.78; t(11) = 3.96, p = 0.002). Vis-Verb scores were not correlated with 
RT (p = 0.97). Accuracy was high across conditions (81%) and varied between 
conditions (BCC: 86%; WCC: 73%; t(11) = 5.09, p < 0.001). Accuracy differences 
significantly correlated with Vis-Verb scores (r = 0.64, p = 0.03), as seen in Experiment 1 
(and shown in Figure 3b). 
 
Imaging Results 
Functional ROIs were identified in the same manner as in Experiment 1. There 
was substantial overlap between the fROIs obtained in Experiment 1 and those obtained 
in Experiment 2, despite several variations in methodology (see Figure 6). Results are 
shown in Figure 4b. In the left fusiform region (66 voxels, t = 5.5, Talairach coordinates: 
-42 -65 -12, BA 19), activation was marginally greater during WCC trials (mean = 
0.43%, SD = 0.15%) than during BCC trials (mean = 0.38%, SD = 0.19%; t(11) = 2.169, 
p = 0.053); this effect was not reliably different in magnitude from that observed in 
Experiment 1, p = 0.15. We also observed a marginally significant positive correlation 
between the magnitude of the main effect and Vis-Verb scores (r = 0.46, p = 0.07). These 
results establish that the effect of context on activation in the left fusiform cortex during 
color retrieval is insensitive to the procedural variations between the two experiments. 
 In the left lingual region (91 voxels, t = 5.0, Talairach coordinates: -12 -87 -1, BA 
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17), there was no significant difference in activation between WCC trials (mean = 0.81 
%, SD = 0.29 %) and BCC trials (mean = 0.80 %, SD = 0.27 %; p = 0.75). As shown in 
Figure 3d, we observed a weak positive correlation between the magnitude of the main 
effect and Vis-Verb scores that did not differ in magnitude from the correlation observed 
in Experiment 1 (p = -0.57), but which also did not reach significance here (p = 0.24).  
 
Additional Analyses 
An exploratory whole-brain analysis revealed several other fROIs that surpassed a 
p < 0.001 (uncorrected) threshold at the whole brain level for the task-baseline contrast. 
As in Experiment 1, within each of these fROIs, we then tested significance of the WCC-
BCC contrast, as well as the correlation between brain activity and Vis-Verb scores. 
These data are reported in Table 1. Unlike Experiment 1, there were no reliable effects 
(of either task or subject variables) in any of these regions. Interestingly, a fusiform 
region which emerged during the exploratory analysis, more posterior to the fusiform 
region identified in our primary analyses and closer to the lingual region identified 
earlier, did not show the condition effect. 
 
Experiment 2: Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated many of the results of Experiment 1, despite a number of 
methodological changes. In Experiment 2, we (i) arranged stimuli in a randomized order, 
preventing subjects from anticipating the trial condition; (ii) reduced the trial duration 
from 9 s to 6 s; and, (iii) presented auditory rather than visual stimuli during color 
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knowledge retrieval. Even with these changes, the main effects followed the same pattern 
as had been observed in Experiment 1. Specifically, in both experiments, context (i.e., 
WCC versus BCC) affected the magnitude of activation for the left fusiform region 
during color knowledge retrieval. In the left lingual region, there was no difference in 
activity between conditions, though weak to moderate correlations were observed 
between the condition effect and cognitive style preference. As noted previously, task 
accuracy in both experiments was positively correlated with a cognitive style favoring 
visual learning in the self-reported VVQ.  
While there was substantial replication between the two experiments, there were a 
few noteworthy differences. First, slightly different parts of the lingual region were 
activated during the color retrieval task — the lingual region activated in Experiment 2 
was more bilateral and anterior to that activated in Experiment 1, though there was some 
overlap. While we have no compelling explanation for this difference, the higher level of 
anterior activation in Experiment 2 is interesting because it is consistent with the 
suggestion that anterior color perception regions involved in color knowledge retrieval 
can be recruited based on task demand (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Simmons et al., 2007). 
Perhaps because of this localization difference, or perhaps because of one of the 
methodological changes between the two experiments, the percent signal change in the 
lingual region was much greater (in both conditions) in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 
1, as seen in Figure 4. This pattern is interesting because ex ante, one might have 
expected that auditory presentation conditions would result in lower levels of activation 
for the lingual region. 
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A second difference between the experiments concerns the correlation between 
effect size and Vis-Verb scores in the lingual region. Though the correlation in 
Experiment 2 replicated that of Experiment 1, the correlation was weaker and did not 
reach statistical significance. This result is interesting because there are both 
methodological and theoretical reasons to expect that the correlation in Experiment 1 
might indeed be higher than in Experiment 2. First, there is generally less statistical 
power in a randomized design than a blocked design (D’Esposito, 2006); under this 
account, a more reliable correlation might have emerged if we had conducted a greater 
number of trials to estimate the condition effect in each subject. Second, if the 
consequence of having a more visual cognitive style is an increased likelihood of 
deploying a visual strategy, then the correlation with cognitive style should be greater 
under conditions that favor the use of anticipatory strategies. In Experiment 2, we 
switched from a procedure that encouraged such strategies (slow trials in a predictable, 
blocked sequence) to one that did not (fast trials in a randomly ordered sequence). 
Consequently, it is not surprising that the correlation with cognitive style should be lower 
in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. 
 
General Discussion 
In this pair of studies, we explored factors that influence the retrieval of color 
knowledge from memory. Specifically, we hypothesized that a task variable (context) and 
a subject variable (here, cognitive style) might both have an effect on the process of color 
retrieval, suggesting that this aspect of semantic memory may be more dynamic and 
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flexible than previously assumed. The results of Experiment 1 supported this hypothesis 
in two ways. First, we observed the effects of a task variable in the left fusiform gyrus, 
where there was significantly greater activity during WCC trials than during BCC trials. 
Second, in the left lingual gyrus, we saw the effects of a subject variable, in that the 
magnitude of the condition effect on an individual subject level positively correlated with 
subjects’ preference for a visual cognitive style, as measured by Vis-Verb scores. 
Experiment 2 introduced several methodological changes; despite these changes, we 
replicated many of the results from Experiment 1.  
 
The nature of factors that influence conceptual processing of color 
In both experiments, task accuracy was positively correlated with the degree of 
visual cognitive style preference. Most subjects were more accurate on the BCC trials 
than the WCC trials, though one subject showed greater accuracy in the WCC trials. 
Nevertheless, subjects with the strongest visual-style preference as measured by the self-
reported VVQ performed with almost equal accuracy, whereas subjects with the strongest 
verbal-style preference displayed differences in accuracy approaching 30% (see Figure 
3a-b). Considering the methodological differences between the two experiments, this 
replication suggests an influence of cognitive style on task performance that is not 
dependent on state effects within a task block (i.e., predicting task condition), nor on the 
modality in which the information is presented (auditory or visual).  
In both experiments, we saw more brain activity in the left fusiform during WCC 
than during BCC trials, and these differences could not be explained by RT differences 
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alone. This replication indicates that color retrieval processes can vary on a trial-to-trial 
basis, driven by the immediate context. There may also be more sustained changes in 
color retrieval strategies that emerge when the context is predictable and ongoing (as in 
Experiment 1), but the findings in Experiment 2 indicate that color retrieval is a 
dynamically changing collection of processes.  
The ability to alter color retrieval processes in contextually-appropriate ways 
might be thought of as a skill that varies across individuals. In accordance with this idea, 
the positive correlation between signal change and Vis-Verb scores in the lingual gyrus 
(robust in Experiment 1, weaker in Experiment 2) suggests an influence of cognitive style 
on knowledge retrieval in an early color perception region (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Chao 
& Martin, 1999; Simmons et al., 2007). For high visualizers (i.e., those with a higher Vis-
Verb score), imagining object colors more closely resembles perception than for low 
visualizers, and perhaps as a result, these subjects tended to perform better under 
conditions that require more detailed color information (i.e., WCC trials). Moreover, this 
result complements some recent findings that modality-specific cortical activity may 
underlie processing related to visual and verbal cognitive styles (Kraemer et al., 2009). 
More generally, one might ask why the fusiform gyrus shows the task effect, 
whereas the lingual gyrus shows effects of the subject variable. Rather than ascribe 
functional descriptions to these two regions, we believe that our demonstration that both 
task and subject variables influence the color knowledge retrieval process can provide 
support for the utility of using multiple approaches to understand the connections 
between brain and behavior. In the experiments detailed here, we used average tendencies 
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in a traditional ROI data analysis to demonstrate differential activation based on 
discrimination of objects from the same or differing color category. Additionally, we 
have found that the variability in these average tendencies is also meaningful with regard 
to cognitive styles, highlighting the informativeness of an individual differences 
approach. By using both types of analyses, our findings help to inform a richer 
understanding of the factors influencing color knowledge retrieval, as has also been true 
of other previous research (Epstein, Higgins, & Thompson-Schill, 2005; Omura, Aron, & 
Canli, 2005).  
 
Reconciling extant findings and representations that vary in “resolution” 
Numerous neuroimaging studies have examined the extent of overlap between 
regions activated by perception and memory of object properties, including color, in 
order to evaluate sensorimotor theories of semantic memory. However, such studies have 
produced rather mixed results. For example, one early experiment failed to detect overlap 
between voxels activated by passive viewing of Mondrian-like displays (color 
perception) as compared with voxels activated by color naming of achromatically 
presented object drawings (color knowledge) (Chao & Martin, 1999). However, another 
study found direct overlap in the left fusiform, using active hue sequencing (color 
perception) and property verification (color knowledge) (Simmons et al., 2007). In the 
current study, we observed overlap between color perception and color retrieval in the 
fusiform gyrus (as in Simmons et al., 2007), as well as in the lingual gyrus (direct overlap 
was not found in Simmons et al., 2007); however, we also found that the magnitude of 
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activation in these regions varied across subjects and across contexts. This variability 
may explain some of the inconsistencies in the literature. 
Given these results, we propose that differences in results across studies may 
reflect the existence of multiple types of color representations that vary in resolution. 
Here, the term “resolution” is used to describe a representation in color space, where a 
high-resolution color representation is one that contains fine detail (e.g. distinguishing 
two shades of red), whereas a low-resolution representation contains coarse detail (e.g., 
red versus yellow). We designed our WCC and BCC trials in order to tap into these two 
types of representations, respectively. Just as responses to visual stimuli can be described 
as varying in abstraction, over low-level properties of the stimulus such as orientation, 
size, and so on, it may also be useful to describe color knowledge at varying levels of 
abstraction. In this way, the idea of multiple color representations is compatible with 
sensorimotor theory, so that retrieval of color knowledge at different levels of resolution 
would recruit perceptual representations with varying levels of abstraction. According to 
this view, overlap between color perception and color knowledge retrieval would depend 
on the “match” in the abstractness of the information represented in each case. It then 
follows that the tasks implemented in previous neuroimaging studies may have tapped 
representations at varying levels of resolution, resulting in slight differences in activation.  
Although our results might suggest the existence of multiple color knowledge 
representations within a sensorimotor framework of semantic memory, we found no areas 
in which there was greater activity for low- versus high-resolution trials. We offer two 
plausible explanations for why there is no variation in activity for the two types of trials. 
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First, given a linguistic input (either written or heard words), these representations might 
be of a serial nature, so that retrieval of the high-resolution representation is dependent on 
(or occurs after) retrieval of the low-resolution representation. Alternatively, the 
representations could be parallel in nature, so that both representations can be accessed 
separately in theory, but a serial strategy is applied for this task. In other words, one 
representation may be used to try to solve the current task, but if the initial attempt is 
unsuccessful, the other type of representation is used instead. Investigation of these 
accounts warrants further study, as the data from the experiments described in this study 
cannot distinguish between the two possibilities.  
There is also an alternative explanation of our data, based on the idea that both 
trial types involved retrieval of a single representation, but that in the high-resolution 
condition, this representation may be more difficult to retrieve. Consistent with this 
explanation, RTs in both experiments were longer for high- versus low-resolution trials, 
and there was differential activation in the fusiform gyrus. However, an explanation in 
terms of varying levels of difficulty seems unlikely for the following reasons. First, RT 
was a covariate in all fMRI data analysis, so that the differences in activation we reported 
for each experiment cannot be attributed to RT differences — indeed, this type of 
hierarchical regression model will tend to underestimate the effect of task on activation. 
Second, in both experiments, the lingual gyrus was activated equally for both retrieval 
conditions, so the specificity of our effects is not well explained by a task difficulty 
explanation. Third, we found a positive correlation of Vis-Verb scores with brain activity 
in the lingual gyrus for Experiment 1, as well as with improved task accuracy. Under a 
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difficulty account, task accuracy should negatively correlate with lingual activity, but we 
do not find this to be the case. 
 
Conclusions 
Taken together, this pair of studies demonstrates the first neuroimaging evidence 
that context (a task factor) and cognitive style (an individual factor) can influence color 
knowledge retrieval. Additionally, these studies suggest that these factors also influence 
the degree to which color knowledge retrieval and color perception share a common 
neural substrate. We have proposed that these factors affect the resolution of the color 
information that is retrieved, and we suggest that the degree of overlap between color 
retrieval and color perception depends on the match between the resolution of the 
information required of each. More generally, these findings illustrate that color retrieval 
is a more dynamic and variable process than previously described, and that some 
modifications may be required to current sensorimotor theories of semantic memory. 
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Table 3.1. Clusters identified in the secondary exploratory, whole-brain analysis. We 
identified brain areas that were active at a p < 0.001 (uncorrected) threshold. Within the ~ 
100 most active voxels in each of these regions, we then tested significance of the WCC-
BCC contrast, as well as the correlation of brain activity with Vis-Verb scores. P-values 
have been Bonferroni-corrected for significance (significant if p < 0.0038). 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 3.1. Design of Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 3.2. Design of Experiment 2. 
 
Figure 3.3. Task accuracy and left lingual gyrus activity correlate with cognitive style 
preference. Pearson correlations (r) of self-reported cognitive style with task accuracy (a, 
b) and signal change in left lingual region (c, d) for Experiment 1 (a, c) and Experiment 2 
(b, d) 
 
Figure 3.4. Areas of visual cortex show differences in activity when retrieving color 
knowledge at differing levels of detail. fROI analysis of left lingual and left fusiform for 
Experiment 1 (visual stimuli, a) and Experiment 2 (auditory stimuli, b). Error bars 
indicate ±1 standard error. 
 
Figure 3.5. Color perception and color knowledge retrieval activate overlapping brain 
regions. Overlap of Experiment 1 fROIs for color perception (red) and color knowledge 
(blue) in left fusiform (a) and left lingual (b) regions. 
 
Figure 3.6. Color knowledge retrieval recruits overlapping brain regions in both 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. fROI overlap in left fusiform (a), left lingual (b). fROIs 
are indicated for Experiment 1 (red), Experiment 2 (blue), and their overlap (green). 
Slices are oriented according to radiological convention. 
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Figure 3.1. 
  
	  
	  
79 
Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.6. 
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CHAPTER 4: Feature diagnosticity affects semantic representations of novel 
objects 
 
Abstract 
A central principle in sensorimotor theories of concepts is that categories may 
differentially rely on certain sensorimotor regions over others due to each category’s 
properties. While there is evidence supporting some basic predictions based on 
sensorimotor theories, less research exists about the principles leading to different 
representations across categories. We explored how feature diagnosticity affected neural 
conceptual representations, by examining how variation in diagnosticity of color 
information affected recruitment of color-sensitive visual areas during conceptual 
retrieval. For a given set of novel objects with assigned colors and names, subjects were 
trained to learn that color and shape (“color+shape”) were necessary features in novel 
object representations (similar to limes and lemons). Alternatively, they learned that 
shape alone (“shape”) was a sufficient feature in novel object representations (similar to 
stop signs and yield signs, where color is available but not necessary). Subjects 
completed a feature-listing task describing the objects, and then performed a shape 
knowledge retrieval task while undergoing fMRI. We found that when rating similarity 
for two objects of the same color, “color+shape” subjects assigned higher ratings than 
“shape” subjects. In the left fusiform gyrus, we found greater activity during the shape 
retrieval task for “color+shape” subjects than for “shape” subjects. Additionally, despite 
comparable explicit object color knowledge between the two groups, prioritizing color in 
the feature-listing task correlated with brain activity in color-sensitive regions during the 
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task. Finally, we also found a correlation of neural similarity with independent behavioral 
ratings of color similarity, but solely for the “color+shape” group. These results suggest 
that both knowledge of feature importance and use of that knowledge contribute to neural 
representations. Further, when object representations are being activated, diagnostic 
features may be retrieved automatically.  
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Introduction 
 We are able to categorize rapidly an endless variety of objects in the world. How 
is the semantic memory system organized in a way that allows us to perform this 
cognitive operation, and what are the neural mechanisms that underlie it? The importance 
of addressing this question is highlighted in patients who present with global 
deterioration of conceptual knowledge accompanying semantic dementia (Bozeat, 
Lambon Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 2000; Snowden et al., 1999; Warrington, 
1975), and particularly in patients with category-specific deficits, where categorical 
knowledge is selectively lost (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983; Warrington & Shallice, 
1984). Neuropsychological observation of these patients led Warrington and McCarthy 
(1987) to propose that the semantic memory system is organized such that differentially 
weighted values from multiple sensory modalities contribute to different object 
categories, which could ultimately give rise to category-specific deficits. For example, 
living things are represented by a greater proportion of visual features than non-living 
things (Farah & McClelland, 1991). 
 This, and other early models of semantic memory, proposed varying importance 
for the perceptual and functional features of objects that were distributed in modality-
specific brain regions. However, they did not specifically address whether certain 
features played a greater role in the connection between feature acquisition and 
subsequent semantic representations. Importantly, previous research has not just been 
limited to sensory or functional features, having investigated the role of particular 
features in earlier studies of categorization and category membership (Rosch & Mervis, 
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1975; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984). More recent connectionist models (Devlin et al., 
1998; Gonnerman et al., 1997) have offered a particular elaboration of prior models of 
semantic memory organization, namely that certain features may be more informative for 
identifying exemplars within a category. That is, when differentiating between a LION 
and a TIGER, “has-fur” or “has-four-legs” will not help to distinguish between the two, 
whereas “has-stripes” will.  
 Behavioral paradigms have demonstrated the effects of feature diagnosticity on 
categorization and prototypicality. Critically, although participants can perceive 
diagnostic features of an object as easily as non-diagnostic features, the features which 
are most useful for discrimination may be selectively attended to and more heavily 
weighted in that object’s representation (Schyns, 1998). Colors can be diagnostic for 
object recognition, and when presented with objects having highly diagnostic colors, 
subjects tend to name the objects faster and with fewer errors than for objects with non-
diagnostic colors (Tanaka & Presnell, 1999). Children can be trained to attend to object 
shape in the context of naming, which helps them to learn object names more quickly 
(Smith, Jones, Landau, Gershkoff-Stowe, & Samuelson, 2002). Finally, adults and 
children can find statistical regularities (diagnostic components) that provide clues for 
segmentation of complex human actions (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Baldwin, Andersson, 
Saffran, & Meyer, 2008).  
 Other studies have also examined the role of feature diagnosticity in semantic 
representations. Some computational models have revealed that diagnostic features, 
which are defined as having more heavily weighted relevance in an object’s 
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representation, are also most vulnerable to damage, both because they are more relevant 
(i.e., more informative), and also because they are more weakly correlated with other 
features of the object (Lombardi & Sartori, 2007; Randall, Moss, Rodd, Greer, & Tyler, 
2004). Further, feature verification tasks of concept-feature or feature-concept have 
shown that diagnostic features hold a privileged status in the overall representation of an 
object, as responses were faster when the feature was diagnostic of the concept than when 
the feature was shared amongst other category members (Cree, McNorgan, & McRae, 
2006).  
 Neuroimaging and neurophysiological evidence has supported the idea of 
differential patterns of activation when retrieving information about diagnostic object 
features. One event-related potential (ERP) study has demonstrated that the weighting of 
object properties depended on specific sensorimotor interactions (pantomiming an action 
or pointing to a feature) during knowledge acquisition. Here, ERP results indicated that at 
300 ms, the dorsal pathway was recruited to a greater extent in the pantomime relative to 
the pointing group, suggesting retrieval of the action associated with each object (Kiefer, 
Sim, Liebich, Hauk, & Tanaka, 2007). Additionally, single-unit and local field potential 
studies have shown selective tuning of neurons in response to relevant features. In 
macaque monkeys, neurons in the inferotemporal (IT) cortex showed an increased 
response to diagnostic features, on the basis of the importance of those features for object 
categorization (Sigala & Logothetis, 2002). A second study found that neurons in the 
anterior IT cortex responded similarly to images showing either 10% or 50% relevant 
information (Nielsen, Logothetis, & Rainer, 2006). This region-specific insensitivity to 
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the stimulus image itself (regardless of feature) was coupled with a graded response to 
behaviorally relevant features in the posterior IT cortex. Thus, parts of a stimulus can be 
preferentially represented if they are diagnostic for a behavior, and the neural 
representation of an object can be influenced by both visual experience and viewing 
history.  
The behavioral and neural evidence presented thus far lends support to the idea 
that diagnostic features have a dynamic interaction with object representations. Forming 
these object representations requires experience, so how does the meaningfulness of that 
experience, such as learning that a feature is diagnostic, influence object representations? 
There has been relatively little research which systematically manipulates feature 
diagnosticity to measure its neural effects on conceptual knowledge. This study focuses 
on precisely that topic. 
Previous work investigating feature diagnosticity has often done so by focusing 
on natural or common object categories, relying on long-term experience with the objects 
in order to detect differential weighting of features in object representations. These 
studies often do not account for the variability introduced in object representations, which 
might partly be caused by variations in overall experience with the tested object 
categories. A complementary approach to these studies is to train subjects on novel object 
sets, which by design bear no resemblance to common object sets. Training paradigms 
carry the important benefit of controlling for stimulus features and subject experience, 
and have been used previously to shed light on conceptual representations (Grossman, 
Blake, & Kim, 2004; James & Gauthier, 2003; Kiefer et al., 2007; Weisberg, van 
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Turennout, & Martin, 2007). 
In the present study, we employ both univariate and multivariate techniques in 
order to tackle the issue of how feature diagnosticity interacts with object 
representations,. Recent neuroimaging studies utilizing multivariate methods have 
demonstrated that patterns of brain activation, as opposed to averaged overall regional 
activation, can carry meaningful information (e.g., Cox & Savoy, 2003; Haxby et al., 
2001; Kamitani & Tong, 2005). These newly developed techniques can detect or decode 
fine-grained information that might not emerge from traditional univariate analyses. 
Multivariate analyses have been used to decode categories of remembered stimuli (Polyn, 
Natu, Cohen, & Norman, 2005), compare similarity of disparate categories (O’Toole et 
al., 2005), and decode neural similarity within a single object category of abstract shape 
(Op de Beeck, Torfs, & Wagemans, 2008), or a single natural category of mammals 
(Weber et al., 2009). These multivariate analyses add a complementary approach to the 
extant fMRI literature (Jimura & Poldrack, 2012). 
 For this experiment, we used a training paradigm to investigate the role of color 
as a diagnostic feature in semantic representations. Subjects were trained on a set of 
novel objects — they either learned that the conjunction of color and shape was 
diagnostic of object category, or they learned that although color was available, shape 
was sufficient to distinguish amongst the objects. Following training, subjects listed 
object features and rated the objects for general similarity. A subset of these subjects 
performed an object shape retrieval task while undergoing fMRI. We found group 
differences in prioritizing color (at the individual item level) and rating general similarity 
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(at the pairwise relational level), despite comparable levels of explicit color knowledge. 
fMRI results indicated greater activation of ventral temporal cortex (specifically, left 
fusiform gyrus and left inferior temporal gyrus) during a shape retrieval task, and also 
suggested that a multivariate measure of neural similarity predicted color similarity 
ratings for the color-shape group only. Together, our results suggest that diagnostic 
features may be accessed automatically when retrieving object representations. The 
features that we use to categorize objects — and not simply the features that we explicitly 
remember about them — contribute to neural representations of novel objects. 
	  
Methods 
Participants: 
Sixty-three (n = 63) healthy subjects participated in the study (17 males and 46 
females; average age = 22.8 years, range = 18–30 years). Thirty-two (n = 32) of these 
subjects participated in the subsequent fMRI portion of the study (9 males and 23 
females; average age = 24.7 years, range = 18–30 years). All subjects were right-handed, 
native speakers of English, and were not taking any psychoactive medications over the 
course of the study. Those subjects who took part in the fMRI portion had no history of 
neurological disorders and a healthy neurological profile. Subjects were paid at the rate of 
$10/hour for behavioral portions of training, and $20/hour for participating in the fMRI 
portion. Subjects provided written informed consent to participate and received monetary 
compensation in return for their participation. The human subjects review board at the 
University of Pennsylvania approved all experimental procedures.  
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Training Materials and Procedure: 
In a between-subjects design, subjects were randomly assigned to learn one of 
two object sets. The between-subjects design was necessary because in a within-subjects 
design, subjects may learn (across training sessions) that one feature is reliable for certain 
objects but not others, which may create unintentional confusion.  
In the “color+shape” set, color is necessary for object identification, and shape 
information is not sufficient (e.g., objects have similar shapes but differ in color, like 
lemons and limes). In the “shape” set, color is available for object identification, but 
shape information is sufficient (e.g., objects differ in both shape and color, like stop signs 
and yield signs). Subjects learned one of these objects sets over the course of four 30-60 
minute training sessions that took place over seven days.  
 
Stimuli: For either object set, as shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2, subjects were 
trained on a set of 36 exemplars of 12 distinct object categories, each with a pseudoword 
name (Rastle et al., 2002). Stimuli were created from scratch in Blender 2.48 
(www.blender.org). All objects were given the same surface texture and illuminated with 
the same single light source. For object shape, we created four shape variants for the 
“color + shape” set, and twelve shape variants for the “shape” set (four of these shape 
variants overlapped with those in the “color + shape” set: fulch, hinch, klarve, screll). For 
object size, we created two additional size variants for each exemplar by halving or 
doubling the scale of the object, thus creating three possible sizes for each object. Note 
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that size was an irrelevant dimension for object identification. For object color, we used 
Blender’s HSV color space, in which color is determined from a set of three values, one 
each corresponding to hue, saturation and value (or luminance). We held saturation and 
value constant, varying hue in order to create six distinct color categories for the objects.  
With the variants that we created for the two object sets, the differences in the sets 
can also be summarized as: 
Color + shape: Shape: 
P(object | color) = 0.50 P(object | color) = 0.50 
P(object | shape) = 0.33 P(object | shape) = 1.00 
P(object | color ∩ shape) = 1.00 P(object | color ∩ shape) = 1.00 
 
Two properties are critical between the two sets. First, note that in order to identify 
successfully each object by distinguishing it from the others in the set (i.e., when 
P(object) = 1.00), the “color + shape” set requires the conjunction of shape and color 
information, whereas the “shape” set only requires shape information. Second, color 
probability (i.e., that P(object | color) = 0.50) is matched between the two groups. 
For each of the 36 exemplars, we then created 10-second videos of each exemplar 
rotating on a raised, black platform against a gray background. In each video, the object 
rotated a full 360 degrees on the platform. For all of the tasks described below, we used 
PsyScope (http://psy.cns.sissa.it) to present stimuli and collect responses and response 
times (RT). The training schedule and list of tasks can be found in Table 4.1. The 
descriptions of training and testing tasks are below. 
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Training, Video Exposure: Subjects viewed the video for each exemplar 
sequentially, and each exemplar was shown twice. This sequential presentation resulted 
in 72 videos that played for approximately 12 minutes. While each video played, the 
name of that exemplar appeared below, and subjects were instructed to repeat aloud the 
name of the object currently being viewed. Subjects watched the videos at the beginning 
of the first, second, and third sessions. 
 
 Training, Naming: We assessed knowledge of the novel objects through a naming 
task. Immediately after viewing the object videos, subjects were presented with a 
screenshot of each of the 36 exemplars. Upon typing that exemplar’s name, they were 
given corrective feedback for their responses. Subjects participated in the naming task 
during each training session. We used four unique screenshots for each exemplar (at the 
50th, 100th, 150th, and 200th frame of the video, counterbalanced across the size variants 
for each object), such that subjects never viewed identical images for the same exemplar 
(or for the same object) during this task. Three subjects who did not exceed 80% 
accuracy on recalling object names by the end of training were excluded from further 
analysis. 
 
 Testing, Adjective Generation Task: Feature listing has previously been used as a 
measure of diagnosticity (e.g., Tanaka & Presnell, 1999), where features that are 
considered to be diagnostic are listed earlier and more often than other features. In line 
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with this rationale, for each trial of this task, we presented subjects with the names of one 
of the learned objects. They were instructed to list a minimum of two (and a maximum of 
four) adjectives that described the object. Subjects, who could proceed at their own pace, 
pressed the ENTER key to proceed to the next trial. We administered this task during the 
third session. 
 
 Testing, Pairwise Similarity Task: We assessed psychological similarity by 
having subjects rate the general similarity of every pairing of the 12 learned novel 
objects, resulting in 66 pairwise ratings. For each trial of this task, we presented subjects 
with two object names, paired together, along with a scale numbered from 1 (very 
dissimilar) to 9 (very similar). Subjects assigned each similarity rating at their own pace, 
and each response triggered the beginning of the next pairing. We administered this task 
during the fourth session. It is important to note that subjects were told to base their 
judgments on general similarity, and they were not asked to base their ratings on any 
particular object features. 
 
 Testing, Color Naming Task: At the end of the fourth session, the experimenter 
verbally named each of the objects individually. Subjects were instructed to report the 
color that they associated with that object, and the experimenter recorded the response. 
 
 Untrained Similarity Rating: In order to assess the relationship between 
behavioral similarity and neural similarity (the procedure for which is described below), 
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we obtained psychological similarity ratings based on perception (i.e., pictures) rather 
than memory (i.e., names) of the novel objects. Thus, we slightly modified the pairwise 
similarity task described earlier. On each trial of this task, subjects who were not 
previously trained on the objects (n = 32 total subjects; n = 16 for each object set) saw a 
pair of object images, side by side, along with a scale numbered from 1 (very dissimilar) 
to 9 (very similar). Subjects did a randomized block of 66 trials in which they based their 
ratings on either color or shape similarity, and then saw the images again and based their 
ratings on the other type of similarity. We randomized trial order within both blocks, and 
counterbalanced block order of color or shape. Post-experiment debriefing revealed that 
the color did not interact with shape similarity, and vice versa.  
 
fMRI Procedure: 
 Shape Retrieval Task: This task was only given to the 32 subjects who returned 
for the fifth and final session of the study. On each trial of the task, while undergoing 
fMRI, subjects read a question about one of the learned objects (e.g., “If you flipped a 
YERTS over, would it stand up straight?”). There were 20 possible questions, and each 
set of 20 questions was asked about each of the 12 objects, resulting in 240 questions. All 
of the questions, which referred to object shape, can be found in Table 4.2. 
The trial structure was as follows: At the beginning of each trial, a “READY?” 
prompt appeared for 500 ms. A fixation cross then appeared for 500 ms, followed by the 
question about the object. While the question remained on the screen for 4500 ms, the 
subject was instructed to determine if the question referred to a plausible detail about the 
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object’s shape, responding “yes” or “no” via button press. At the end of the trial, a central 
fixation cross appeared for 500 ms, for a total trial duration of 6000 ms. Text was 
presented as white font on a black background. 
 Each subject completed four scanning runs of the shape retrieval task 
(approximately 9 minutes each) with 60 trials of the task per run. Using a rapid, event-
related design, we presented a unique trial order to each subject, using Optseq2 
(http://surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq) to generate optimized pseudo-random 
stimulus presentation sequences. Experimental trials were intermixed with jittered 
fixation periods averaging 6 seconds in length. 
 
 Functional Localizers: After subjects completed the shape retrieval task, we 
administered two “functional localizers” in order to identify brain regions involved in 
either color or shape perception. For the color perception localizer, subjects saw blocks of 
the Farnsworth-Munsell 100-hue stimuli, in which they judged whether chromatic or 
grayscale visual stimuli were made up of wedges sequentially ordered from lightest to 
darkest. The methods and stimuli for this task were identical to those used previously to 
identify brain regions involved in color perception (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Hsu et al., 
2011; Simmons et al., 2007). 
 For the shape perception localizer, subjects performed a one-back task on blocks 
of either intact shapes or scrambled images. On a 100 x 100 unit grid of black lines on a 
white background, 108 intact and filled shapes were individually presented in the central 
(20 x 20) portion of this grid. The 40 central units were scrambled to create the 108 
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scrambled images that preserved visual complexity but removed continuous borders. 
Subjects saw randomly presented blocks of either 20 intact shapes or 20 scrambled 
images. Within any given block, each image was presented for 400 msec, followed by a 
blank screen that lasted for 500 msec, and two of the images would repeat. Subjects were 
instructed to press a button each time they detected a repeated image. Each block lasted 
for 18 sec, followed by 12 sec of fixation between blocks. 
 Subjects performed practice versions of all scanning tasks prior to the scan. 
 
Image Acquisition  
 We acquired imaging data using a 3T Siemens Trio system with an 8-channel 
head coil and foam padding to secure the head in position. After we acquired T1-
weighted anatomical images (TR = 1620 msec, TE = 3 msec, TI = 950 msec, voxel size = 
0.9766 mm x 0.9766 mm x 1.000 mm), each subject performed the color knowledge 
retrieval task, followed by the color perception task, while undergoing blood oxygen 
dependent (BOLD) imaging (Ogawa et al., 1993). We collected 998 sets of 42 slices 
using interleaved, gradient echo, echoplanar imaging (TR = 3000 msec, TE = 30 msec, 
FOV = 19.2 cm x 19.2 cm, voxel size = 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm x 3.0 mm). At least 9 seconds 
of “dummy” gradient and radio frequency pulses preceded each functional scan to allow 
for steady-state magnetization; no stimuli were presented and no fMRI data were 
collected during this initial time period.  
 
Neuroimaging Data Analysis 
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 We analyzed the data off-line using VoxBo (www.voxbo.org) and SPM2 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk). Anatomical data for each subject were processed using the 
FMRIB Software Library (FSL) toolkit (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl) to correct for 
spatial inhomogeneities and to perform non-linear noise reduction. Functional data were 
sinc interpolated in time to correct for the slice acquisition sequence, motion corrected 
with a six-parameter, least squares, rigid body realignment routine using the first 
functional image as a reference, and normalized in SPM2 to a standard template in 
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space. The fMRI data were smoothed using a 
9mm full-width half-max (FWHM) Gaussian smoothing kernel. Following preprocessing 
for each subject, a power spectrum for one functional run was fit with a 1/frequency 
function, and this model was used to estimate the intrinsic temporal autocorrelation of the 
functional data (Zarahn et al., 1997). 
 We fit a modified general linear model (Worsley & Friston, 1995) to each 
subject’s data, in which task trials were each modeled as separate event with a 6 sec 
duration, and convolved with a standard hemodynamic response function. Several 
covariates of no interest, such as scan effects and movement spikes, were included in the 
model. From this model, we computed parameter estimates for the task (compared to 
fixation baseline) at each voxel. These parameter estimates were included in the group-
level random effects analyses described below. 
 
Results 
Behavioral results: 
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Training: Naming task. For naming task performance (see Figure 4.3), we 
performed a repeated measures ANOVA (“color + shape” – n = 29; “shape” – n = 34) 
with a Greenhouse-Geisser correction on naming response accuracy. This ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of training condition (F(1,61) = 11.42, p < 0.001, a 
significant main effect of session F(1.28, 78.00) = 98.53, p < 0.001), and a significant 
interaction of training condition and session (F(1.28, 78.00) = 7.21, p < 0.01). Critically, 
by the fourth session which marked the end of the training period, the groups did not 
differ in naming accuracy, as both groups were equally proficient at correctly producing 
the names of the learned objects (mean accuracy for “color + shape”: 97.4%, mean 
accuracy for “shape”: 98.3%; t(61) = 1.25, p > 0.2). These preliminary results suggest 
that any differences on subsequent tasks cannot be attributed to differences in how well 
both groups learned and knew the objects.  
We performed a similar ANOVA on RT across the four sessions. This ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of training condition (F(1,61) = 22.53, p < 0.001), a 
significant main effect of session (F(1.11, 67.80) = 72.49, p = 0.001), but no interaction 
of training condition and session (F(1.11, 67.80) = 1.49, p > 0.2). By the fourth session, 
the groups significantly differed in RT, with “color + shape” subjects taking longer to 
produce the object names (mean RT for “color + shape”: 1417 ms, mean RT for “shape”: 
1077 ms; t(61) = 5.39, p < 0.001).  
 
Testing: Adjective Generation and Color Naming Tasks. For each subject, we 
determined how often a color adjective correctly describing the object appeared as the 
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first or second listed adjective. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction of adjective order and training condition (F(1,61) = 32.88, p < 0.001). An 
independent samples t-test of color as the first adjective revealed that “color + shape” 
subjects nearly always listed a color adjective first, and that “shape” subjects did not 
(“color + shape”: M = 87.9%, SE = 4.0%, “shape”: M = 44.6%, SE = 6.5%; t(61) = 5.44, 
p < 0.001). Despite this discrepancy in when the subjects listed color adjectives, 
importantly, the groups did not differ in explicit color knowledge, as measured by their 
ability to name the object colors afterwards (“color + shape”: M = 93.4%, SE = 2.3%, 
“shape”: M = 90.5%, SE = 1.9%; t(61) = 0.98, p > 0.3, ns). These results, shown in 
Figure 4.4, suggest that although the groups remembered object color equally, training 
affected the extent to which they prioritized color in their representations of the objects. 
 
Testing: Pairwise Similarity Task. For each subject, we examined pairings that 
referred to same- or different-colored object pairs, and same- or different-shaped object 
pairs. (It should be noted that in the “shape” set, there were no object pairs that were 
same-shaped.) These results are shown in Figure 4.5. Both “color + shape” subjects and 
“shape” subjects assigned same-colored object pairs a higher average similarity rating 
than different-colored object pairs (“color + shape”: same color M = 4.94, SE = 0.28, 
different color M = 2.69, SE = 0.08, t(28) = 8.38, p < 0.001; “shape”: same color M = 
4.21, SE = 0.24, different color M = 2.74, SE = 0.19, t(33) = 7.04, p < 0.001). Critically, 
“color + shape” subjects assigned same- versus different-colored object pairs a higher 
range of general similarity ratings (as measured by same minus different) than did 
	  
	  
102 
“shape” subjects, and this group difference was statistically significant (t(61) = 2.27, p = 
0.03). Same-shaped object pairs received the highest similarity ratings from the “color + 
shape” subjects (same: M = 7.20, SE = 0.17, different: M = 1.94, SE = 0.10; t(28) = 
24.02, p < 0.001).  
Though both groups had the option to use the full 1 to 9 rating scale, the overall 
range of ratings did differ between groups, with “color + shape” subjects using a wider 
range of ratings than “shape” subjects (“color + shape” M = 8.31, SE = 0.13; “shape” M = 
6.76, SE = 0.33; t(61) = 4.06, p < 0.001). Mean ratings did not differ between the groups 
(“color + shape” M = 2.89, SE = 0.79; “shape” M = 2.87, SE = 0.19; t(61) = 0.11, p > 
0.9). 
These results suggest that the groups differ in the extent to which they weigh 
color as part of the overall object representation, with “color + shape” subjects using a 
wider range of similarity ratings to distinguish between object pairs. We now turn to 
neuroimaging methods, in order to investigate whether some of these observed behavioral 
differences are reflected in neural differences. 
 
fMRI results: 
 ROI univariate analysis. In order to establish functionally defined regions of 
interest (fROIs) in which we could assess any group differences in task effects, we first 
performed a group-level random effects analysis on the color perception data, comparing 
brain activity of colored stimuli to that of grayscale stimuli, as in prior studies. No 
regions responded more to grayscale than colored stimuli. We performed an identical 
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analysis on the shape perception data, separately from the color perception data, in which 
we compared brain activity of intact shape stimuli to that of scrambled image stimuli, 
also as in prior studies (e.g., Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000). 
From the set of fROIs that emerged from this analysis, we identified the peak 
cluster of voxels from lingual and fusiform gyri, as these regions have been documented 
previously for their involvement in color perception and color knowledge retrieval 
(Beauchamp et al., 1999; Hsu et al., 2011; Martin, 2007; Simmons et al., 2007). To create 
fROIs of comparable size across regions, we identified approximately 50 maximally-
responsive voxels in each of these regions, which required adjusting the threshold for 
each individual fROI. Finally, within each of these fROIs, we calculated parameter 
estimates for each subject on the spatially-averaged time series, in other words across the 
50 voxels in the fROI, using these parameter estimates to assess task effects between the 
two groups. We assessed task effects by using an independent samples t-test of the 
difference in task effect between the “color + shape” and “shape” groups. 
 The left fusiform region (48 voxels, peak voxel t = 6.37, Talairach coordinates:  
-30, -56, -17, BA 37) was sensitive to both color perception and a group difference in the 
“shape” task (see Figure 4.6). Here, activation was significantly greater for the “color + 
shape” subjects (mean % signal change = 0.41%, SE = 0.07%) than for the “shape” 
subjects (mean % signal change = 0.22%, SE = 0.06%; t(30) = 2.02, p = 0.05). The 
lingual region (52 voxels, peak voxel t = 9.56, Talairach coordinates: 3, -92, 20, BA 
19/17) was sensitive to color perception, but did not show a significant group difference 
in activity during the “shape” task (“color + shape”: mean % signal change = 0.32%, SE 
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= 0.08%; “shape”: mean % signal change = 0.19%, SE = 0.08%; t(30) = 1.11, p > 0.2, 
ns). Both the left lateral occipital complex (LOC) and right LOC were involved in shape 
perception, but neither region showed a group difference in task activity (left LOC: t(30) 
= 0.70, p > 0.4; right LOC: t(30) = 0.65, p > 0.5).  
 We thus focused the next set of analyses on activity in the left fusiform gyrus, as 
this was the only region from the ROI analysis that was involved in color perception and 
which also demonstrated a group difference in activity in the shape retrieval task. 
 
 Multivariate neural similarity analysis. We next adopted a measure of neural 
similarity from Weber and colleagues (2009) in order to see if activation patterns in the 
left fusiform fROI (48 voxels) predicted behavioral similarity ratings. For each of the 12 
probed items, we identified a pattern of activation of vector length equal to the number of 
voxels in the fROI. Although the order of the voxels in the vector was arbitrary, it was 
consistent across all patterns. Some voxels within the fROI were, on average, more active 
than others; thus, in order to prevent mean activation of voxels from driving our 
similarity measure (a Pearson correlation), we mean-centered each voxel’s response to its 
average response across all items. We calculated neural similarity by correlating each of 
the 66 vector pairs, then assessed whether these values could predict behavioral ratings of 
similarity. We could not assume a linear relationship for the behavioral ratings of 
similarity; in other words, the difference between ratings of 4 and 5 is not necessarily the 
same as the difference between ratings of 8 and 9. Consequently, we used the Spearman 
rank correlation coefficient to assess the relationship between neural and behavioral 
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similarity. 
 As shown in Figure 4.8, in the left fusiform gyrus, color similarity ratings 
approached significance in predicting neural similarity for the “color + shape” subjects 
(rs = 0.22, p = 0.08), but not for the “shape” subjects (rs = -0.13, p > 0.2). These 
predictions were significantly different from each other (Z = 1.98, p < 0.05). Shape 
similarity ratings did not predict neural similarity in this region. for either the “color + 
shape” subjects (rs = 0.18, p = 0.17) or the “shape” subjects (rs = 0.01, p > 0.9). 
Interestingly, this pattern switched direction in the lingual gyrus. In that region, color 
similarity ratings better predicted neural similarity for the “shape” subjects (rs = 0.25, p = 
0.04) than for “color + shape” subjects (rs = -0.14, p > 0.2), and these predictions 
significantly differed (Z = -2.22, p = 0.03). 
 
Exploratory analyses. In order to assess the specificity of our effect, we examined 
other regions of the left ventral temporal cortex other than those used for our primary a 
priori analyses. For this analysis, we looked at an anatomically-defined left ventral 
temporal cortex region (~ 5500 voxels). In this region, we looked for voxel clusters (> 50 
voxels) that showed a significant task (task versus baseline) X group (color+shape versus 
shape) interaction at a cluster-corrected, permuted threshold of α < 0.05. Only one region, 
namely the left inferior temporal gyrus (Talairach coordinates of peak voxel: -56, -53, -
12, BA 20), surpassed this threshold.  
In this region (see Figure 4.7), we found significantly greater activity during the 
shape retrieval task for color/shape-trained subjects than for shape-trained subjects (p < 
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0.001). As shown in Figure 4.9, we also found that the extent to which subjects 
prioritized color during the adjective generation task (i.e., how often they listed the object 
color as the first adjective) predicted activity in this region (r = 0.50, p < 0.01). Similar 
patterns were observed in the left fusiform gyrus and lingual gyrus, the two regions 
identified from the color perception functional localizer. It should be noted that the 
adjective generation task was performed on the third day of training, whereas subjects 
performed the shape retrieval task during the fifth session. This result suggests that when 
retrieving object knowledge, diagnostic features may be automatically activated. The 
range of general similarity scores for same- versus different-colored object pairs also 
correlated with activity in this region, such that a wider range of scores positively 
correlated with activity in the left inferior temporal gyrus (r = 0.39, p = 0.02).  
 
Discussion 
In the current study, we report several behavioral and neural results indicating that 
feature diagnosticity affects semantic representations. In addition to behavioral group 
differences at both the individual exemplar and pairwise comparison level, we report a 
neural instantiation of feature diagnosticity. In ventral temporal cortex, and specifically in 
the left fusiform gyrus and left inferior temporal gyrus, we found greater activity for 
subjects who had learned color was a useful diagnostic feature when performing a task 
that did not require color retrieval. Finally, we found that in the left fusiform gyrus, 
behavioral ratings of color similarity predicted neural similarity for the “color + shape” 
group only, and that prioritizing color correlated with activity in the left inferior temporal 
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gyrus. Together, these results suggest that our knowledge of feature importance for object 
categorization, in addition to using that knowledge, affects neural representations of those 
objects. To our knowledge, this study is the first to demonstrate an important role for 
feature diagnosticity, when the diagnostic feature (here, color) is systematically 
manipulated.  
The adjective generation task and color naming task showed that while both 
groups were equally proficient in explicit color knowledge, the “color + shape” subjects 
prioritized color more by listing it first more frequently. This result is particularly 
interesting in light of some work from Connolly and colleagues (Connolly, Gleitman, & 
Thompson-Schill, 2007), which used an implicit similarity measure to assess how both 
sighted and congenitally blind subjects represented fruits and vegetables — a category in 
which color is arguably a diagnostic feature. Although both sighted and congenitally 
blind subjects were equally proficient at knowing the colors of the fruits and vegetables, 
only the sighted subjects used color as the primary basis for their implicit similarity 
judgment. The authors suggested that visual experience (or lack thereof) had contributed 
to a fundamental group difference in how conceptual representations for these categories 
were structured.  
Our results replicate and extend those of Connolly and colleagues. We matched 
our training stimuli in terms of color availability and probability (for both sets, it was 
always the case that P(object | color) = 0.5), yet we found fundamental differences in 
how subjects weighed color in their conceptual representations of the objects. We can 
stipulate color knowledge of a klarve for both groups of subjects from the color naming 
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task, but the adjective generation task yields information about the usefulness of color in 
distinguishing a klarve from the other objects in the set. 
The results from these two tasks are also compelling for another reason. The 
shapes used in the training stimuli were deliberately created such that they bore no 
resemblance to common objects and thus would not be easily named. In the adjective 
generation task, subjects tried (and occasionally struggled) to generate adjectives for the 
objects, sometimes resorting to shape adjectives that were easily verbalized (e.g., a klarve 
is “curved”), or likening the shapes to ones that they knew (e.g., a klarve is “football-
like”). Given this observed difficulty in describing the objects, one might expect the 
subjects to then rely on color: a salient feature of the object that is easily named. 
However, as described above, we observed that “shape” subjects did not use color for this 
purpose — and for some of these subjects, color was never mentioned at all. This result 
strengthens our argument that the object set differences, together with subsequent 
differences in visual experience, contributed to fundamental differences in how the 
groups represented the novel objects. 
While the adjective generation task is a useful method of investigating object 
representations at the item level, the pairwise similarity data provided a complementary 
method for investigating the representations at the relational level. Knowledge of an 
object category can extend beyond its respective label to include similarity, and several 
theories have proposed that similarity amongst instances of a category is critical for 
category membership (Murphy, 2004). The data here demonstrate a fundamental 
difference in how the “color + shape” subjects considered the general similarity of same- 
	  
	  
109 
versus different-color object pairs. Given the unavoidable heterogeneity in constructing 
the two object sets, restricting the analysis to those stimuli that were shared between the 
two groups (klarve, hinch, fulch, screll) replicated our initial similarity findings. The 
“color + shape” subjects both rated same-color object pairs as being more generally 
similar than did the “shape” subjects, but they also rated different-color object pairs as 
being more generally dissimilar than did the “shape” subjects. In addition to replicating 
our earlier similarity data, this analysis demonstrates that diagnostic features can be 
regarded in the long-term experience context of other objects in the set. Not only does 
feature knowledge affect a conceptual representation, but our data show that the use of 
that knowledge, and the learned context of the objects, can also affect conceptual 
representations.  
Turning to the neuroimaging data, we hypothesized a group difference in 
accessing color as a diagnostic feature during a shape retrieval task in the left fusiform 
gyrus. Our findings were in line with our initial hypothesis, in that the left fusiform gyrus, 
which is known to be a region involved in color perception (Beauchamp et al., 1999; Hsu 
et al., 2011; Simmons et al., 2007), was indeed more active during the shape retrieval task 
for “color + shape” subjects than for “shape” subjects. These results are all the more 
compelling, given than the shape retrieval task never explicitly probed subjects about 
object color, and color was irrelevant to the task. Our findings suggest that diagnostic 
features may be accessed automatically, when retrieving other non-diagnostic features of 
an object representation. 
Further, our follow-up exploratory analyses revealed a pattern in the left inferior 
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temporal gyrus that was somewhat unexpected. This region was lateral and anterior to the 
medial fusiform region that has been identified through the color perception functional 
localizer here and in previous work. Chao and Martin (1999) previously showed that the 
left inferior temporal gyrus was involved in color knowledge retrieval. In that study, the 
experimenters identified the region as having a greater response to naming colors 
associated with achromatically presented object drawings, versus naming the objects 
themselves. Further, the extent to which subjects prioritized color during the adjective-
generation task correlated with activity in this region (and this pattern was similar in 
other color perception regions), suggesting a neural basis for the importance that subjects 
assigned to color during object learning. 
Our results in both the left fusiform gyrus and left inferior temporal gyrus could 
be interpreted as falling within anterior portions of the ventral visual pathway, but it has 
been suggested that object representations may be abstracted as they move from primary 
visual cortex to downstream visual areas. More specifically, whereas posterior visual 
areas such as the lingual gyrus might be sensitive to the sensory qualities of stimuli, 
regardless of task, the anterior visual areas such as the fusiform and inferior temporal gyri 
might be more involved in higher order categorization.  
Interestingly, our analysis of neural similarity revealed an unexpected pattern. In 
the left fusiform gyrus (which had demonstrated group differences in task activity), color 
similarity ratings better predicted neural similarity for “color + shape” subjects. By 
contrast, in the lingual gyrus, color similarity ratings better predicted neural similarity for 
“shape” subjects. The difference in the group patterns in these two regions suggests 
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functional differences between lingual gyrus and fusiform gyrus as reflected in the two 
object sets. More specifically, the extent of color information for the “shape” subjects 
might be limited to sensory color qualities of the objects, reflected in the correlation of 
behavioral and neural similarity in the lingual gyrus. If color information for the “color + 
shape” subjects is carried to higher order areas, because of the diagnosticity of color 
information for these objects, that might be reflected in the correlation of behavioral and 
neural similarity for these subjects in the fusiform gyrus. 
The nature of our novel object sets, in a sense, forced subjects to categorize 
objects according to strict color-shape conjunctions. Thus, our experimental design may 
have been more amenable towards group differences in an anterior color region, but it 
does not preclude similar group differences in a posterior color region. In fact, group 
differences in the shape task showed the same directional effect in lingual gyrus as in 
fusiform gyrus, though not significantly so. Since the magnitude of the group difference 
increased from the posterior to anterior regions of ventral temporal cortex, this result 
might suggest an increased sensitivity to diagnostic features in regions which are tuned to 
object categorization. In line with this theory, Nielsen and colleagues (2006) found that 
the macaque IT cortex differentially responded to diagnostic features along a posterior-
anterior axis, and that only the anterior portion of the recording area responded with 
diagnostic local field potential (LFP) activity. 
Studies that utilize a training paradigm are methodologically attractive, as they 
control for variables such as viewing experience and viewing history, which, under 
experience-based models of semantic memory, can introduced unwanted variability to 
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object representations. An important remaining question is the extent to which the results 
from the training paradigm described in this study would generalize to common object 
categories. For example, fruits and vegetables are a common object category for which 
color is arguably a diagnostic feature, unlike tools or household items. Thus, during a 
shape retrieval task, we might expect greater activity in color-sensitive regions for fruits 
and vegetables than for household items. Our finding of automatic color knowledge 
retrieval in the left inferior temporal gyrus, replicating a main finding from Chao and 
Martin (1999) when retrieving color knowledge about common objects, suggests that we 
might expect to observe such generalization. 
Collectively, the results of the current study provide unique evidence that 
diagnostic features affect novel object representations through not only what we know 
about the novel objects, but also how we use that knowledge. Our findings suggest that 
neural representations may not be stable and fixed, but may instead be far more dynamic 
and flexible than previously thought (Binder & Desai, 2011; Hoenig, Sim, Bochev, 
Herrnberger, & Kiefer, 2008; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, in press). More broadly, our results 
suggest that feature diagnosticity is one of many sources contributing to variation in 
semantic representations, the neural correlates of which may underlie our ability to 
categorize rapidly the massive variety of objects that we encounter on a daily basis. 
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Table 4.1. Subject training schedule, in which the specific combination of tasks is 
indicated for each session of the experiment. 
 
 Session 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Training      
Training Videos u u u   
Naming Task u u u u  
      
Testing      
Adjective Generation   u   
Pairwise Similarity    u  
fMRI + memory task     u 
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Table 4.2. The list of questions used in the shape retrieval task that subjects performed 
while undergoing fMRI. Note that “chulge” here is an example — we asked the same list 
of 20 questions of all 12 novel object categories. 
 
 
List of Questions: 
Could you cut something with a CHULGE?  
Could you poke a hole with a CHULGE?  
Could you roll a CHULGE down a hill?  
Could you use a CHULGE as a weapon?  
Does a CHULGE have corners?  
If you flipped a CHULGE over, would it stand up straight?  
Is a CHULGE bulging?  
Is a CHULGE bumpy?  
Is a CHULGE cubic?  
Is a CHULGE flimsy?  
Is a CHULGE fragile?  
Is a CHULGE made up of smaller parts?  
Is a CHULGE rounded?  
Is a CHULGE sharp?  
Is a CHULGE symmetrical?  
Is a CHULGE tied together?  
Would a CHULGE be easy to wrap up (e.g., as a present)?  
Would you be able to spin a CHULGE?  
Would you call a CHULGE curved?  
Would you consider a CHULGE to be flat?  
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 4.1. Exemplars from the “color + shape” object set. 
 
Figure 4.2. Exemplars from the “shape” object set. 
 
Figure 4.3. Naming accuracy by session. The groups did not differ in naming accuracy 
by the end of training, as indicated by ceiling accuracy from both groups during the 
fourth session. 
 
Figure 4.4. Differences in knowing versus naming colors. (left) The groups differed in the 
extent to which they prioritized color, as measured by the frequency of listing color early 
in an adjective generation task. “Color + shape” subjects listed color as the first adjective 
earlier and more often than did “shape” subjects. (right) The groups did not differ in 
explicit color knowledge. 
 
Figure 4.5. Similarity judgments vary by group. “Color + shape” subjects (left) utilized a 
greater range of general similarity judgments than “shape” subjects did (right), 
particularly when judging same- versus different-colored object pairs. 
 
Figure 4.6. Group differences in activation of a color perception region during a shape 
retrieval task. During a shape retrieval task, the left fusiform gyrus, a region involved in 
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color perception as defined by greater response to chromatic than achromatic visual 
stimuli, was more active for “color + shape” subjects than for “shape” subjects. 
 
Figure 4.7. Task activity in the left inferior temporal gyrus. Exploratory analyses 
revealed that the left inferior temporal gyrus demonstrated a significant task x group 
interaction, with “color+shape” subjects demonstrating more task activity than “shape” 
subjects.  
 
Figure 4.8. Correlating behavioral and neural similarity. Behavioral ratings of color 
similarity from a set of untrained subjects approach significance in predicting neural 
similarity of novel object activation patterns in the left fusiform gyrus, but only for the 
“color + shape” subjects, shown in blue. “Shape” subjects are shown in red. A different 
pattern is seen in the lingual gyrus, with no significant pattern seen in the left inferior 
temporal gyrus. 
 
Figure 4.9. Correlating color prioritization with task activity. Prioritizing color during 
the adjective generation task only correlated with activity in the left inferior temporal 
gyrus, a second region active during the shape retrieval task that was identified through 
secondary exploratory analyses. Patterns in the same direction were observed in the left 
fusiform gyrus and lingual gyrus. 
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Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.3. 
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Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.5. 
  
	  
	  
122 
Figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.8. 
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Figure 4.9.  
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CHAPTER 5: General Discussion and Future Directions 
 
 
We began by noting that you probably know what color fire engines are supposed 
to be, and the kinds of sounds that cows make. We also noted that this type of knowledge 
is known as semantic memory, and that the neural mechanisms underlying semantic 
memory are complex. Numerous behavioral, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological 
studies have investigated these topics, many of which have found evidence supporting the 
notion of a distributed semantic memory system that is organized by sensory modality 
(e.g., Allport, 1985; Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). Models of a distributed 
semantic memory system predict that overlapping or adjacent brain regions are likely to 
be involved in both perception and memory retrieval of conceptual representations. The 
major goal of the three investigations described above was to investigate the 
commonalities and variations in the mapping between perception and memory, in order 
to gain a deeper understanding of how conceptual representations are instantiated in the 
brain.  
In Chapter 2, we applied the logic behind many neuroimaging studies of semantic 
memory, and were able to show that the left lingual gyrus was involved in chromaticity 
of both color perception and color knowledge. In Chapter 3, we demonstrated that the 
mapping between perception and memory varies across different contexts, in the form of 
high- versus low-fidelity of retrieved color information. Color knowledge retrieval can 
also vary across participants, as individual differences predicted activity in the left lingual 
gyrus. In Chapter 4, we used a complementary approach to studies of semantic memory, 
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by utilizing a training paradigm based on novel objects in order to investigate the role of 
feature diagnosticity. This study showed that feature importance and feature use can both 
affect conceptual representations. Specifically, we found that in object representations, 
there were differences in “knowing about” versus “using” diagnostic features. We also 
found that activity in ventral temporal regions — specifically, the left fusiform gyrus and 
the left inferior temporal gyrus — varied according to that feature’s importance.  
Combining the results from these three different studies allows us to speculate on 
how this work might be relevant to theories of semantic memory.  
 
Insight into color representations in the ventral visual pathway 
 Neuroimaging results of color perception found that ventral fROIs uniformly 
showed chromaticity effects, whereas dorsal fROIs did not. In Chapter 2, we found 
chromaticity effects in both color perception and color knowledge in the left lingual 
gyrus, a very posterior visual region. The left fusiform gyrus, further anterior (and 
downstream) from the lingual gyrus, demonstrated a robust task effect, but a weak – at 
best – chromaticity effect. The different responses in these distinct visual regions suggest 
functional differences between early and downstream regions of the visual pathway, 
which may have different properties for color representations. 
 First, the mapping between perception and memory may vary as a function of 
progression along the visual pathway. Simmons and colleagues (2007) have examined the 
role of lingual and fusiform gyri in perception and memory, suggesting posterior regions 
underlie low-level sensory color experience, whereas anterior regions underlie higher-
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level color representations. Because we used a luminance (i.e., brightness) judgment for 
assessing both color perception and color knowledge, we may have tapped into lower-
level sensory qualities of the stimuli, thereby enhancing the chromaticity effect in 
posterior lingual regions, and not in anterior fusiform regions.  
If anterior regions are indeed more sensitive to higher-level representations of 
color, then we would expect to see greater chromaticity effects in an anterior fusiform 
region if the task tapped into categorical color representations. One way to test this 
prediction would be to use the same chromatic stimuli as described in Chapter 2, but 
instead of a luminance judgment, subjects would be asked to make a color judgment in 
terms of “warm” (red, orange, and yellow) versus “cool” (blue, green and purple). 
Adopting this taxonomy would not call direct attention to color categorization per se, but 
might instead drive activation forward into an anterior region which is expected to have 
greater sensitivity to higher-level color representations. 
 Alternatively, it may be the case that chromatic color space varies from 
achromatic color space. As discussed in Chapter 2, we did observe a higher magnitude of 
response to chromatic versus achromatic stimuli, but that observation in itself does not 
distinguish between potential differences in the activation patterns elicited by different 
color categories within those respective color spaces. In other words, remembering purple 
items and green items may elicit overall activation that is greater than remembering gray 
items and white items. But, activation patterns of purple and green items may be more 
different than activation patterns of gray and white items. Studies that examine multi-
voxel patterns in the brain (e.g., Haushofer, Livingstone, & Kanwisher, 2008; O’Toole, 
	  
	  
129 
Jiang, Abdi, & Haxby, 2005; Weber, Thompson-Schill, Osherson, Haxby, & Parsons, 
2009) are well-suited for investigating this type of discrimination, and might be a useful 
way to purple this question in future research. Specifically, we would expect to see 
superior classification performance in early visual areas (e.g., lingual gyrus) when 
distinguishing chromatic from achromatic items, whereas classification performance in 
downstream visual areas (e.g., fusiform gyrus) might be activated in differentiating 
purple from green items. 
 
Variation in semantic memory retrieval across individuals 
 A high proportion of work in neuroimaging has implicitly assumed that brains are 
approximately homogeneous, at least in terms of their low-level functions. In recent 
years, some cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists have begun advocating a more 
nuanced strategy, which would incorporate both group-based (experimental) and 
individual-based (correlational) ways of studying brain and behavior. In this perspective, 
experimental approaches would identify commonalities in a population, whereas 
correlational approaches can focus more closely on variation amongst individuals. Such 
an approach would be consistent with the comments of Thompson-Schill and colleagues, 
“the mark of a theory’s explanatory power is the degree to which it makes successful 
predictions not only about the central tendency of a population, but also about the 
individuals within that population” (Thompson-Schill, Braver, & Jonides, 2005). Though 
there was initially some general reluctance to combine these two approaches, particularly 
in neuroimaging studies (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 2002), the correlational approach has 
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become more prevalent in psychological domains such as personality, decision-making, 
and cognitive control abilities. 
 Chapter 3 demonstrates that we can uncover meaningful results by making use of 
both experimental and correlational approaches. In particular, we did not find a main 
effect from our task in early visual cortex (e.g., left lingual gyrus), but we did find 
considerable variation in activity across individuals. Specifically, we found that subjects 
who self-reported having preference for a visual cognitive style, as opposed to a verbal 
cognitive style, tended to achieve better task accuracy and also showed greater activity in 
early visual cortex. This result suggests that visualizers are inclined to remember color 
information in higher fidelity, maintaining a representation of that information that is 
closer to how that information was initially perceived. This finding also suggests a neural 
instantiation in the brain for Allan Paivio’s dual-coding theory (Paivio, 1969), which 
proposed distinct representations for information processed separately in visual and 
verbal channels.  
 Individual variation in knowledge representations is a compelling idea, especially 
given that semantic memory is typically thought of as being general knowledge which is 
shared across a population. What are the properties of our conceptual representations that 
can demonstrate this individual variation? As discussed in Chapter 3, activity in the 
posterior visual cortex did appear to correlate with cognitive style, whereas activity in the 
anterior visual cortex did not. This difference between the anterior and posterior cortices 
suggests that individual variation in shared knowledge representations can vary in both 
style and magnitude along the visual pathway. Specifically, it may be true that the degree 
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of interaction between individual variation in conceptual knowledge representations is 
more prominent in early visual cortex than in downstream visual cortex. But, if 
abstraction of information occurs through the visual pathway – analogous to hierarchical 
visual processing for object recognition (Grill-Spector & Malach, 2004) – individual 
variation might also decrease as information moves along a posterior-anterior axis. If this 
hypothesis is correct, then information would become more “individual-invariant.” One 
potential avenue for future research would be to sample the visual pathways along this 
axis, in order to assess how abstraction of information interacts with individual 
differences in conceptual representations, and perhaps also is affected by preference with 
respect to the format of conceptual representations. 
 
Variations in semantic memory across different contexts 
 The results reported in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that there can be variation in 
knowledge retrieval based on both short-term contextual factors (e.g., task demands) and 
long-term contextual environment (e.g., other present object categories). Chapter 3 
demonstrated the existence of short-term context effects in the fidelity of color 
representations during a similarity task. Chapter 4 focused instead on long-term context 
effects, and showed that subjects judged differently the four object categories that were 
shared across the different groups of novel objects, depending on whether color was a 
relevant distinction in differentiating between objects. Together, these results show that 
context plays an important role in semantic representations.  
 The results of Chapters 3 and 4 show that context can affect representations at 
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multiple timescales. This is consistent with other research demonstrating a timescale for 
activation of object features (Yee, Huffstetler, & Thompson-Schill, 2011). Using an eye-
tracking paradigm, Yee and colleagues demonstrated that object representations unfold 
over time, and that specific features such as shape were accessed earlier than general 
features such as function. In line with those findings, the experiments in Chapter 3 
suggest a neural basis for requiring a particular specificity in retrieved color information 
(through context-related task demands).  
Future research on how contextual factors can affect semantic representations 
might use a joint eye-tracking and fMRI approach in order to tackle some of the 
dynamics of these context effects. Specifically, we would predict that even if subjects 
look towards objects that share a similar association (e.g., function), we might still 
observe increased brain activity in independent regions subserving perception of the 
specific, unique feature of those objects (e.g, shape). Using shape as the example here, 
we might predict activity in regions such as bilateral lateral occipital complex (LOC) or 
lingual gyrus.   
Over the long term, contextual association depends on experience. For instance, 
someone who is habitually exposed only to red apples and yellow lemons will probably 
build up a strong association between “red” and “apples,” whereas someone who is 
habitually exposed to red apples, red cherries, and yellow lemons is likely to have a far 
weaker association between “red” and “apples.” Such effects might be at least partially 
independent of short-term contextual factors, because at least in theory, there is no 
amount of task demand could vary the association of red with “apple-cherry” to match 
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that of “apple-lemon” (or vice versa). Alternatively, if task demand were able to match 
the two associations, then this would demonstrate the existence of an interaction between 
short- and long-term contextual factors. As discussed in Chapter 4, it is difficult to devise 
experiments covering such interactions with the use of real-world objects. By contrast, 
training paradigms based on novel objects can be a useful tool for experiments in this 
area, as they permit experimental manipulation and control of viewing experience, 
viewing history, and task demands. 
 Another possible avenue for future research in this area would focus on the 
interaction between episodic and semantic memory, and more specifically, whether the 
variation in learning rate of the novel objects reflected meaningful individual differences 
that we did not test in the current set of studies. The critical test for the experiments 
described in Chapter 4 was that both groups had achieved ceiling naming accuracy by the 
end of training, which was our measure of object knowledge. However, there was 
substantial variation in the rate at which subjects learned the names and attributes of the 
novel objects, with some subjects achieving ceiling accuracy after just one session. In 
addition, subjects anecdotally revealed different strategies for remembering the objects. 
As an example, one subject verbalized his strategy for remembering the whemp (a 
bronze-orange colored object) as sounding like “wimp.” To him, because wimps finish, at 
best, in third place, he associated whemp with bronze. For other subjects, it was a matter 
of “catching on” to the rules before they were able to reach ceiling accuracy on object 
knowledge. 
An experimental strategy which incorporated individual differences could 
	  
	  
134 
uncover the reasons for some of this temporal variation, and thus shed light on the 
differences in learning rate among individuals. Through this approach, one could also 
investigate differences in the individual strategies used to categorize objects. As one 
example, subjects utilizing a verbal association strategy might be able to categorize 
rapidly objects faster than subjects who utilize alternative strategies. Although a verbal 
strategy presents an advantage for this specific paradigm, in different contextual 
environments it might be inferior to other strategies. For example, an environment 
requiring feature matching would presumably favor visual rather than verbal strategies, 
so that individuals preferring the visual style would be able to learn more quickly than 
their counterparts who favor the verbal style. Much more generally, this approach to 
research into the interactions between semantic and episodic memory might provide 
greater insight into the meaningful variation across individuals. 
 
A dynamic color network? 
 The results from these three studies suggest that semantic knowledge is 
represented by a highly interactive and dynamic network. Posterior visual regions appear 
to be sensitive to the sensory qualities (such as luminance) of visual information, and are 
also sensitive to individual preferences or strategies (such as visualizing versus 
verbalizing) for information representation. By contrast, anterior visual regions do not 
appear to be sensitive to the sensory qualities of visual information, but are important in 
retrieving varying degrees of knowledge “resolution” and also in retrieving diagnostic 
and useful features automatically. These studies show that item-level variation (from 
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objects and individuals) affects early visual areas, whereas more relational and higher-
order context-level variation (from task demands or learned environment) affects 
downstream visual areas. 
These results are consistent with a general view that visual information travels 
along a hierarchy of processing, along a posterior-anterior gradient (e.g., Grill-Spector & 
Malach, 2004). Visual representations can be represented at multiple levels of abstraction 
along this gradient, and are affected by a number of single and relational factors along the 
visual pathway. The neuroimaging-based results shown here could corroborate vision 
research, and provide evidence that semantic representations can be similarly dynamic 
and complex. 
 
Conclusions 
 The research described in this dissertation focused on semantic memory, which is 
the basis for shared general knowledge. The results of these three studies help to delimit 
the variation and the commonalities in this shared general knowledge, allowing us to 
better understand the neural mechanisms underlying how we give meaning to endless 
variation in the world. The studies described here have demonstrated that in distinct 
regions subserving perception and memory, there is meaningful variation in context, 
individual differences, and information utility. These studies paint a richer and more 
complex picture of how we represent object categories, and how those representations are 
instantiated in the brain. In particular, the results presented here suggest that there is a 
network of visual regions, and that some of these regions are sensitive to contextual 
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factors, while others represent item-level or relational differences. Therefore, these 
studies can provide a framework for a deeper understanding of the interactions between 
brain and behavior.  
More generally, research in the domain of episodic memory has repeatedly 
demonstrated that memory is not infallible. Semantic memory is defined as being distinct 
from episodic memory, because it assumes generalities in shared knowledge. The 
majority of prior research has assumed that semantic memory is more stable than 
episodic memory, but the results shown above suggest that it may no longer be 
reasonable to maintain this assumption. The results of these studies may form the basis 
for showing how variations and commonalities can both be influential in neural 
representations of objects, and thus help us better understand how both factors can affect 
the ways in which we identify and give meaning to the objects and phenomena that we 
encounter in the world.  
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